The console now works as the cluster's editor, without the monitoring pages.
Web: Blocklists gets Add/Edit/Remove for BlockList objects (and shows ones the
resolver has not compiled yet); Clients marks cluster groups and locks config-file
groups and the default policy; Upstreams becomes a read-only health view when the
config cannot be written; Zones and Domains lose the managed-directory and list
copy; the Local zones page and its API calls are removed; nav is Status,
Blocklists, Domains, Lookup, Address redirects, Zones, Clients, Upstreams, Settings.
Console: a change to a group the resolver's config file defines is refused with the
reason instead of being skipped silently, and /api/clients says what the console
can and cannot edit.
Server: isFileWritable called a read-only existing file (a mounted ConfigMap)
writable, and api.allow_config_write was not reflected in the writable flag nor
checked by the upstream/ACL edit path. Both fixed; tests pin them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DO NOT SYNC THIS BEFORE MIGRATING. Removing fancy-dns-zones and fancy-dns-rpz
from the kustomization lets a pruning GitOps tool delete them, and they hold the
only copy of the zones and address redirects until the objects exist. Follow
deploy/MIGRATION.md: install the definitions, run `fancy-dns-console migrate`
against the live cluster, then roll this out.
The StatefulSet starts the resolver with -kube and no longer mounts the two
ConfigMaps; its service account loses the ConfigMap role and keeps only the
read-only Role on the fancy-dns objects (crds/rbac.yaml). The kustomization now
installs the definitions and that Role. The shipped config no longer lists the
migrated sources.
Config validation no longer refuses an enabled blocklist with no sources in the
file, because BlockList, DomainRule and AddressOverride objects can supply every
rule and the file cannot know. The existing "no source" warning says so. That
removed the only validation message the settings tests used as a fixture; they
now use an invalid acl.default_policy, and an empty settings document is refused
by the handler instead of by that check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Zones, address redirects, inline rules, lists and groups are cluster objects now
(see the previous commits and deploy/MIGRATION.md), so the mechanisms that held
them are gone:
* internal/kubezones and the resolver's service-account access to a ConfigMap,
the address-overrides read/write path and its poller, the zone-file poller and
the Local zones editor with its /api/local-zones routes.
* localzone.Managed, the directory of console-written master files, and the
blocklist.managed_zones key. The resolver now writes no zone data at all; its
zone hooks only list. The shared half of that file (the record validator, the
renderer and the round-trip check) stays as zonestate.go, because DNSZone
rendering is built on it. Its tests are ported to RenderZone, which keeps the
coverage of every editable record type, wildcards, relative owners, the
SOA/NS rule and the delegation rule.
* Tests of the removed write paths: the contract test now builds its zone from a
DNSZone, and a new test pins that every zone write route on the resolver is
refused and changes nothing.
Standalone installs keep editing master files on disk and SIGHUP, and the
YAML-backed domain, client, upstream and settings editors, which have not moved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
With the resolver no longer storing traffic history or a query log, the pages
built on them have nothing to show. The Dashboard becomes a Status page: health
and the reasons for a degraded state, uptime, what is compiled (blocklist rules,
local zone records), the cache with a flush button, per-pod upstream health and
the listeners. Logs and Cache are removed along with the SSE client, the chart
code and the recharts dependency.
api.links (grafana, logs, metrics) names where the charts and the query log
live. GET /api/links serves them and the Status page shows buttons for the ones
that are set, or says how to set them. They are rendered as hrefs, so config
validation refuses anything but http(s) and the page checks again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The resolver kept its own query-log store (a bbolt ring, a live ring with SSE
fanout, rolling per-domain counters and dashboard time-series) for the console.
In a multi-node deployment each pod held a different slice of that, so every
view disagreed with itself, and the cost sat on the query path. Charts belong
in Grafana and log search in the log collector, so the store is gone.
internal/accesslog writes one JSON line per notable query to stdout. The default
is what was blocked and what failed (blocked, redirected, SERVFAIL, dropped,
refused); log_cached and sample_rate add ordinary answers for a debugging
session. Lines go through a bounded buffer to a single writer goroutine and are
dropped, and counted in fancydns_access_log_dropped_total, when the stream
cannot keep up, so a stalled log pipe can never stall a query. The config key is
access_log (the old qlog block is ignored, like any unknown key).
The metrics gain what the dashboard used to compute: fancydns_group_queries_total
by ACL group and outcome and fancydns_responses_total by RCODE. Removed with the
store: /api/dashboard, /api/logs, /api/logs/stream, /api/logs/clear,
/api/cache/top, the series rings, and the cache's per-name hit table, which took
a mutex and built a string on every cache hit.
Tests that read the old log now read the access-log lines; the contract test
drops the removed endpoints. The web console still calls them and is changed in
the next commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
fancy-dns-console is a second binary holding the web UI, authentication and
every edit. It writes ClientGroup, BlockList and DNSZone objects through the new
kubeedit package and forwards all other /api routes to a running resolver
with its own key, dropping the browser's credentials, so it can run in the
cluster or on a workstation with a kubeconfig and nothing about the resolver's
placement matters. The resolver never imports kubeedit and the console is not on
the DNS path.
kubeedit validates every spec with the runtime's own converters
(kubesource.CheckGroup/CheckList/CheckZone) before writing, so the console
cannot store an object the resolver would reject. Zone edits keep the
file-based writer's behaviour: duplicate and below-a-delegation records are
refused, a delegation in a new zone also gives the zone its servers, and a
zone with no apex NS is never stored. Each object records the editing user in
an annotation; updates retry on conflict.
The resolver reports groups from ClientGroup objects as source "kubernetes" and
counter-only rows (the "(default)" bucket, or a group removed since) as
"history", and lists DNSZone zones as the editable ones. The console uses that
to leave the YAML's groups alone and to drop history rows, which the UI would
otherwise send back on save. Its GET /api/clients overlays the cluster's
current objects on the resolver's list, because the resolver only sees an edit
after its watch fires and a save made just after another would delete the
first.
An end-to-end test runs both halves against one fake apiserver: a group saved
through the console refuses queries, a zone built record by record answers
authoritatively, and a request with the resolver's own key is rejected by the
console.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The runtime can now take ClientGroup, BlockList and DNSZone objects
(fancydns.k6n.net/v1alpha1) from a cluster with -kube, from a pod's service
account or a kubeconfig alike. internal/kubesource watches them with dynamic
informers, converts and validates each object on its own, and publishes an
immutable snapshot. A bad object is skipped and keeps its last good version,
so one broken edit cannot remove a running policy; an invalid merged config is
dropped whole. The last snapshot is saved so a restart without apiserver access
still serves.
config.Store gains an overlay: Base() is what the YAML says, Get() is base plus
cluster objects. Everything that writes the config back (mutateConfig,
SetAdminAddr, the settings editor) now starts from Base(), otherwise cluster
objects would be copied into the file and shadow their own objects. YAML wins
every name collision. putACL and toggleBlocklist refuse to edit cluster-owned
objects. BlockList has no path field and refuses file:// URLs so a namespaced
object cannot pick files the runtime reads or writes. DNSZone is rendered
through the zone writer's own prove-by-reparse step, with the SOA serial taken
from metadata.generation so every replica renders identical bytes.
qlog: Flush reset the pending slice to [:0], so entries logged while it was
still storing the batch were appended over the same backing array. The race
detector found it through the new Kubernetes integration test. pending is now
set to nil, with a regression test that fails without the change.
CRD manifests, RBAC and examples are in deploy/k8s/crds; tests pin the schemas
to the Go spec structs so the two cannot drift.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The console could not see local zones at all. `blocklist.local_zones` compiled
a store that nothing read back: there was no API for a zone, its records, its
delegations or the file a record came from, and no way to change one without
editing YAML and reloading. The Domains page is the blocklist's inline rules,
not local data, so nothing in the console covered the half of the server that
answers authoritatively from disk. There is now a Zones page and the endpoints
behind it: `GET /api/zones`, `POST`/`PUT`/`DELETE /api/zones/records`,
`POST`/`DELETE /api/zones/delegations` and `DELETE /api/zones?zone=`.
**The console owns one directory and nothing else.** `blocklist.managed_zones`
holds one `<apex>.zone` per zone, with that zone's SOA, apex NS set and the
records added there, and it is compiled by the same `localzone.Load` as the
operator's files — so a record added from the console is served on the next
query, with no reload and no restart. Files in `blocklist.local_zones` are
listed and shown read-only and are never rewritten; the key defaults to empty,
so a deployment that never sets it gets a zone browser and no zone writes.
Which file a record came from is now part of the store (`zone.files`, keyed by
the index the store already uses), so the snapshot can say "console" or "your
file" per record; the query path does not read it.
**The writer proves its own output.** A record is validated by the project's own
master-file parser, so `www` means `www.<zone>` and a bare CNAME target is
completed exactly as it would be in a zone file; the file is rendered, and the
rendering is re-parsed and compared with the records it meant to write before
the file is renamed into place. A writer bug that dropped a record would
otherwise present as a zone that silently stopped answering. A zone that cannot
answer is refused rather than created: no SOA means no NXDOMAIN or NODATA
authority, and no apex NS means nothing is delegated and no server is named. The
SOA's primary follows the apex NS set — a zone whose SOA names a server outside
its own NS set hands out a referral no resolver can follow — and the serial
moves on every write.
**A delegation takes the names under it, so a record below a cut is refused.**
The store answers those names as delegated without reading the zone file, which
would make the record data that looks alive and never answers. `DELETE
/api/zones?zone=` exists for the same reason from the other side: a zone the
console created is a real zone, so it says NXDOMAIN for what it does not hold,
and deleting a record is not what gives a name back to upstream. It is
refused for a zone that also has records outside the managed directory, because
removing that file would remove none of the zone.
**Two bugs the work turned up.** `engine.applyConfig` published local-record
metrics only when `blocklist.local_zones` was non-empty, so a zone the console
created was served but never counted; the gate is now the store's own record
count. And the record-value renderer fell back to `RR.String()` for every type
it did not know, which is the whole line rather than the RDATA — it wrote a
name and a TTL into the value column for DHCID, LOC, SSHFP and SVCB, and would
have fed that back as a record value on the next edit.
Every write recompiles the store and flushes the cache. Which names changed is
not knowable from the API, and a cached upstream answer for a name the zone now
answers is simply wrong, so the flush is blunt on purpose.
The wire shapes are type aliases in `internal/api` rather than copies, so there
is one set of json tags, and `TestZoneEndpointKeySets` pins the key set at every
level with a record and a delegation actually present — an empty list only
proves the envelope. `TestZoneWritesNeedAManagedDirectory` pins the read-only
default, and `TestZoneConsoleRoundTrip` walks the whole thing: a record added
through the API is answered authoritatively on the next query, a cut stops the
parent answering below it, and deleting the zone hands the name back.
Verified against a running instance built from this tree: records and
wildcards answer with `aa`, relative names are qualified, a record below a cut
is refused with a message that says why, and the file on disk is a zone file
an operator can read. The console page is typechecked and built; the browser was
not available in this round, so it has not been looked at.
Local zones were only editable as mounted files, so operators could not manage DNS entries from the console. Add a Local zones editor backed by a shared Kubernetes ConfigMap, validate master files before saving, scope the pod service account to that ConfigMap, and reload changed zones on every replica while flushing stale cache entries.
internal/app/contract_test.go asserts the exact JSON key set of every admin
endpoint, and the console was reading fields that shape does not contain —
which is how a page can be entirely blank while the Go suite is green. The
types file is rewritten against the canonical shapes and every consumer is
fixed onto it.
The page bugs that came out of it:
The cache "Lookups" column read `count` and "Last seen" read `last_seen`; the
cache tracks a hit counter and a byte count per name and sends `hits`, so
there is no last-seen data to show at all. Lookups now reads hits, Last seen
is gone, and the row's bytes are shown. The "Size" card shows bytes_human,
with size as the entry-budget hint it actually is.
The Sources table read `item.enabled`, `item.rules`, `item.bytes`,
`item.updated_at` and `item.err`; those live under `item.meta`, so the table
was blank and the per-row toggle posted `name: undefined`. The refresh toast
counted the names echoed back and said "every source" for an empty list.
The dashboard read `qps` and `total_queries` where the server sends
`queries_per_sec` and `queries_total`, and rendered a `latency`/`p99` block
the dashboard response never contained. The `Partial<Dashboard>`-and-cast
that papered over this is gone. `blocked_pct` arrives as 0..100 from REST and
0..1 over SSE, so formatPercent is 0..100 only and a new formatFraction
handles the SSE frame.
Logs rendered `qtype` as a string; it is a number, with `qtype_name`
alongside, so there is a formatQtype that prefers the name. The Domains page
read `item.list` where the server sends `source`, and showed an Updated column
with no timestamp behind it.
Upstreams treated `healthcheck_interval` and `breaker_cooldown` as numbers of
seconds; they are duration strings now, so the page parses them like the
bootstrap refresh it already handled and the write payload no longer sends the
runtime health fields the server ignores. A group edit stripped the four
server-owned counters before writing, because config.Group would reject them.
`whoami.can_write` and `whoami.read_only` were fetched and never used, so a
read-only API key still showed every Save control. A single whoami fetch now
lives in a session provider behind the app shell, every write control is
gated on it, and a banner says why when the key is read-only. It fails open:
an unreachable probe must not lock an operator out of their own console.
Two server fixes the console work exposed, both pinned by the contract test:
POST /api/blocklists/refresh with a body that omits `names` answered
{"names": null}, and the console counts the names it gets back to build its
toast — so "refresh everything" said "0 sources". A nil slice now becomes an
empty one and the key set does not depend on the request.
blocklist.SourceMeta.duration was a raw time.Duration, so it went out as a
nanosecond count and the console divided by 1e6 to compensate — the only
duration on the wire that was not a duration string. It is a config.Duration
now, and formatDuration parses it like the others.
The contract test grew to cover what the first pass left out: the domain
check in all three of its shapes (match, miss, and an error delivered as 200),
the log clear, the settings validate in both the valid and the malformed case,
the settings save and reload, and the first SSE frame.
The console's TypeScript types are hand-written and apiFetch ends in
`JSON.parse(text) as T`, so nothing in the toolchain compared them with the
Go structs. A field that lost its json tag, or a response a struct never had,
showed up as an empty table in a browser and nowhere else: the Go suite was
green and the console was wrong. internal/app/contract_test.go now asserts the
exact JSON key set of every admin endpoint, driven through the real router
with the real hook implementations, plus a test that drives the two write
endpoints with the exact payload web/src builds.
The drift it found, all four fixed here:
blocklist.Source and SourceMeta had no json tags at all, so GET /api/blocklists
sent Go field names ("URL"/"Format") where the console expects snake_case: the
Sources table rendered blank rows and its per-row toggle posted
`name: undefined`. Tagged to match ParseStats.
acl.GroupSummary was flat where the console reads a nested `match` object — the
same shape config.Group has — so every group card read "matches nothing". The
four match fields are nested now, under a new acl.Match.
PUT /api/clients answered 400 `json: unknown field "ptr_suffixes"` to the
console's payload, because config.Group and config.Match carried yaml tags only
and the decoder runs with DisallowUnknownFields. Both structs have json tags
now; the same applies to config.UpstreamServer and UpstreamBootstrap.
PUT /api/upstreams answered 400 `json: unknown field "health"`, because the
console round-trips the whole server object it read, runtime health fields
included. They are accepted and ignored, because the server owns them, and they
are `yaml:"-"` so settings.yaml does not gain runtime state.
Also fixed, each with a test:
A duration on the wire was a nanosecond count. config.Duration had a
MarshalYAML but no MarshalJSON, so bootstraps[].refresh arrived as 30000000000
while the console typed the field as a string, and healthcheck_interval was a
float of seconds in one place and a string in another. Durations on the wire
are duration strings everywhere now — the same spelling config.yaml uses — and a
bare JSON number is still accepted and means seconds, not nanoseconds.
TestDurationJSONForm used to pin the old behaviour and now pins the new one,
saying in its comment that the old behaviour was the bug.
A log row's key set depended on the row. api.LogEntry was omitempty on
client_group, response, upstream and list, so a query with no ACL group
arrived without the key and the console rendered "undefined" where the column
should be empty. The contract test can only pin one shape if the server emits
one, so nothing on that struct is omitempty any more.
A dead peer stayed in the cluster peer list forever. Cluster.seen was only ever
added to and deleted from on an explicit `bye`, so a node that crashed — or
whose Valkey connection died — was reported as a live peer for the life of the
process, and its stale blocklist digest was flagged as divergence forever.
Peers() now reaps peers unheard for peer_ttl*4 and stamps each state with the
receiver's own clock, so clock skew between two machines can neither reap a
healthy peer nor keep a dead one. Discover() ages out the same way on the
publisher's own last_seen stamp, because the keyed Valkey record outlives a
crash: a live node keeps refreshing the key's TTL, so a dead node's field stayed
readable for the life of the fleet.
peer_ttl: 0 would have crashed the process. time.NewTicker(PeerTTL/2) panics on
a non-positive period and `EXPIRE key 0` deletes the heartbeat key, so a config
that left peer_ttl unset would have taken the process down at Start, or made
every instance believe it is alone in the fleet. Both go through peerTTL() and
peerDeadline(), which fall back to the default.
Two cluster tests raced on the wire, not on the product, and one was
environment-dependent rather than wrong. A node that joined after another's
heartbeat was in flight hears about it on the next tick, so "b does not see a"
read immediately after "a sees b" is a coin flip; the divergence test waited for
a digest on the wrong node's view of the fleet; and 127.0.0.1:1 is only
unbindable outside a container that sets
net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start=0, where it binds and the partial-bind test
fails with both transports up. That test now occupies a port with a live
listener in the test process, which is a deterministic EADDRINUSE on every
machine and every uid.
internal/server/counters_test.go covers the counter-key layer that no other
test touched: the "<transport>.<field>" keyspace, that the aggregate folds only
the known fields, and that the snapshot is safe while counters move.
Two pinned behaviours changed on purpose, each with a test that says so:
An RPZ record did not cover the name it names. rpzRule gave a bare owner name
the subdomain form (*.name), so analytics.example.org. in a policy zone blocked
cdn.analytics.example.org. and left analytics.example.org. resolving normally —
and an rpz-passthru. record did not allowlist its own domain either. RPZ
semantics say the record applies to the domain and everything under it, so a
bare owner now takes the apex form **.name; an owner written with an explicit *.
is still strict, so a zone that wants subdomain-only behaviour can still ask for
it. This changes which queries get blocked for an existing policy zone, which is
why it wanted a decision. TestExampleRPZZoneCoversTheApexItNames pins both
halves and the example zone now says which half it relies on.
metrics.OutcomeLocal had no producer. The engine reported a local-zone answer as
qlog.ActionAllow, which outcomeFor mapped to OutcomeUpstream, so every locally
answered query was counted as an upstream one and the outcome="local" series was
never published — the dashboard's local column was permanently empty.
Response.Local is now set on the local-zone path and outcomeFor consults it
first. That moves published counters, so the README's metrics section says so
too.
internal/api is the admin REST + SSE surface and had no test file at all,
so nothing pinned the auth modes, the X-Forwarded-For trust boundary, the
rate limiter or the fact that a read route must not mutate anything. This
adds a local harness (a Server over fake hooks on an httptest listener,
with a real config file on disk) and three test files.
What it pins:
* Routing. A table over every route in Server.routes: each one answers 200
and reaches the hook it is supposed to, so a new route without a case
here is a route nothing tests. Plus method-not-allowed / 404 / outside
the base path, a base path other than /api, and a read-route sweep that
asserts no mutating hook was reached, the config generation did not move
and the file on disk is byte-identical afterwards. A panicking component
becomes a 500 and the server keeps serving, because the admin API is the
only way to fix a broken instance.
* Auth. All three modes. apikey: the right key always works, and a prefix,
a suffix, a case-folded key, a wrong basic password, an unknown bearer
token, an unsupported scheme and a malformed Authorization header never
do; curl -u any:KEY is accepted because that is what clients send.
basic: bad username and bad password refused, a successful login issues a
bearer token, the token works for the whole API, basic auth also works
per request, an API key is not a credential in this mode, logout revokes
the token, and a token past its session_ttl stops working. none: nothing
is required and the caller runs as a writable loopback principal. trust
_loopback: a local client with no credentials is let through, and a
forwarded non-loopback client is not. Every mutating route refuses a
read-only key with 403 without reaching its hook or touching the file
(and the same request with a read-write key succeeds, so the 403 is about
the key and not the payload), and allow_config_write: false refuses the
settings editor with a valid key while the other mutations still work.
The hashing is pinned on the state, not on timing: the authenticator's
maps are keyed on the SHA-256 of the credential and hold no plaintext key
or password, so a copied server struct cannot leak one.
* Product code is untouched; the suite is `package api` with its own setup.
mats
