b2cd7d4b91bc6a6541093fa4f3df00dbd5d6b4d3
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Commits
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b2cd7d4b91 | mroe ui | ||
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504512f247 |
Add a Zones console: create and manage local zones, records and delegations
The console could not see local zones at all. `blocklist.local_zones` compiled a store that nothing read back: there was no API for a zone, its records, its delegations or the file a record came from, and no way to change one without editing YAML and reloading. The Domains page is the blocklist's inline rules, not local data, so nothing in the console covered the half of the server that answers authoritatively from disk. There is now a Zones page and the endpoints behind it: `GET /api/zones`, `POST`/`PUT`/`DELETE /api/zones/records`, `POST`/`DELETE /api/zones/delegations` and `DELETE /api/zones?zone=`. **The console owns one directory and nothing else.** `blocklist.managed_zones` holds one `<apex>.zone` per zone, with that zone's SOA, apex NS set and the records added there, and it is compiled by the same `localzone.Load` as the operator's files — so a record added from the console is served on the next query, with no reload and no restart. Files in `blocklist.local_zones` are listed and shown read-only and are never rewritten; the key defaults to empty, so a deployment that never sets it gets a zone browser and no zone writes. Which file a record came from is now part of the store (`zone.files`, keyed by the index the store already uses), so the snapshot can say "console" or "your file" per record; the query path does not read it. **The writer proves its own output.** A record is validated by the project's own master-file parser, so `www` means `www.<zone>` and a bare CNAME target is completed exactly as it would be in a zone file; the file is rendered, and the rendering is re-parsed and compared with the records it meant to write before the file is renamed into place. A writer bug that dropped a record would otherwise present as a zone that silently stopped answering. A zone that cannot answer is refused rather than created: no SOA means no NXDOMAIN or NODATA authority, and no apex NS means nothing is delegated and no server is named. The SOA's primary follows the apex NS set — a zone whose SOA names a server outside its own NS set hands out a referral no resolver can follow — and the serial moves on every write. **A delegation takes the names under it, so a record below a cut is refused.** The store answers those names as delegated without reading the zone file, which would make the record data that looks alive and never answers. `DELETE /api/zones?zone=` exists for the same reason from the other side: a zone the console created is a real zone, so it says NXDOMAIN for what it does not hold, and deleting a record is not what gives a name back to upstream. It is refused for a zone that also has records outside the managed directory, because removing that file would remove none of the zone. **Two bugs the work turned up.** `engine.applyConfig` published local-record metrics only when `blocklist.local_zones` was non-empty, so a zone the console created was served but never counted; the gate is now the store's own record count. And the record-value renderer fell back to `RR.String()` for every type it did not know, which is the whole line rather than the RDATA — it wrote a name and a TTL into the value column for DHCID, LOC, SSHFP and SVCB, and would have fed that back as a record value on the next edit. Every write recompiles the store and flushes the cache. Which names changed is not knowable from the API, and a cached upstream answer for a name the zone now answers is simply wrong, so the flush is blunt on purpose. The wire shapes are type aliases in `internal/api` rather than copies, so there is one set of json tags, and `TestZoneEndpointKeySets` pins the key set at every level with a record and a delegation actually present — an empty list only proves the envelope. `TestZoneWritesNeedAManagedDirectory` pins the read-only default, and `TestZoneConsoleRoundTrip` walks the whole thing: a record added through the API is answered authoritatively on the next query, a cut stops the parent answering below it, and deleting the zone hands the name back. Verified against a running instance built from this tree: records and wildcards answer with `aa`, relative names are qualified, a record below a cut is refused with a message that says why, and the file on disk is a zone file an operator can read. The console page is typechecked and built; the browser was not available in this round, so it has not been looked at. |
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32f940b763 |
Add UI editing for local DNS zones
build / build-push (push) Successful in 29s
Local zones were only editable as mounted files, so operators could not manage DNS entries from the console. Add a Local zones editor backed by a shared Kubernetes ConfigMap, validate master files before saving, scope the pod service account to that ConfigMap, and reload changed zones on every replica while flushing stale cache entries. |
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2348d2e4b4 |
add
build / build-push (push) Successful in 30s
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70d85eac59 |
Bring the console onto the contract the Go side now pins
build / build-push (push) Failing after 25s
internal/app/contract_test.go asserts the exact JSON key set of every admin
endpoint, and the console was reading fields that shape does not contain —
which is how a page can be entirely blank while the Go suite is green. The
types file is rewritten against the canonical shapes and every consumer is
fixed onto it.
The page bugs that came out of it:
The cache "Lookups" column read `count` and "Last seen" read `last_seen`; the
cache tracks a hit counter and a byte count per name and sends `hits`, so
there is no last-seen data to show at all. Lookups now reads hits, Last seen
is gone, and the row's bytes are shown. The "Size" card shows bytes_human,
with size as the entry-budget hint it actually is.
The Sources table read `item.enabled`, `item.rules`, `item.bytes`,
`item.updated_at` and `item.err`; those live under `item.meta`, so the table
was blank and the per-row toggle posted `name: undefined`. The refresh toast
counted the names echoed back and said "every source" for an empty list.
The dashboard read `qps` and `total_queries` where the server sends
`queries_per_sec` and `queries_total`, and rendered a `latency`/`p99` block
the dashboard response never contained. The `Partial<Dashboard>`-and-cast
that papered over this is gone. `blocked_pct` arrives as 0..100 from REST and
0..1 over SSE, so formatPercent is 0..100 only and a new formatFraction
handles the SSE frame.
Logs rendered `qtype` as a string; it is a number, with `qtype_name`
alongside, so there is a formatQtype that prefers the name. The Domains page
read `item.list` where the server sends `source`, and showed an Updated column
with no timestamp behind it.
Upstreams treated `healthcheck_interval` and `breaker_cooldown` as numbers of
seconds; they are duration strings now, so the page parses them like the
bootstrap refresh it already handled and the write payload no longer sends the
runtime health fields the server ignores. A group edit stripped the four
server-owned counters before writing, because config.Group would reject them.
`whoami.can_write` and `whoami.read_only` were fetched and never used, so a
read-only API key still showed every Save control. A single whoami fetch now
lives in a session provider behind the app shell, every write control is
gated on it, and a banner says why when the key is read-only. It fails open:
an unreachable probe must not lock an operator out of their own console.
Two server fixes the console work exposed, both pinned by the contract test:
POST /api/blocklists/refresh with a body that omits `names` answered
{"names": null}, and the console counts the names it gets back to build its
toast — so "refresh everything" said "0 sources". A nil slice now becomes an
empty one and the key set does not depend on the request.
blocklist.SourceMeta.duration was a raw time.Duration, so it went out as a
nanosecond count and the console divided by 1e6 to compensate — the only
duration on the wire that was not a duration string. It is a config.Duration
now, and formatDuration parses it like the others.
The contract test grew to cover what the first pass left out: the domain
check in all three of its shapes (match, miss, and an error delivered as 200),
the log clear, the settings validate in both the valid and the malformed case,
the settings save and reload, and the first SSE frame.
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9881d2a095 |
Make the API response contract a test; fix what it found
The console's TypeScript types are hand-written and apiFetch ends in
`JSON.parse(text) as T`, so nothing in the toolchain compared them with the
Go structs. A field that lost its json tag, or a response a struct never had,
showed up as an empty table in a browser and nowhere else: the Go suite was
green and the console was wrong. internal/app/contract_test.go now asserts the
exact JSON key set of every admin endpoint, driven through the real router
with the real hook implementations, plus a test that drives the two write
endpoints with the exact payload web/src builds.
The drift it found, all four fixed here:
blocklist.Source and SourceMeta had no json tags at all, so GET /api/blocklists
sent Go field names ("URL"/"Format") where the console expects snake_case: the
Sources table rendered blank rows and its per-row toggle posted
`name: undefined`. Tagged to match ParseStats.
acl.GroupSummary was flat where the console reads a nested `match` object — the
same shape config.Group has — so every group card read "matches nothing". The
four match fields are nested now, under a new acl.Match.
PUT /api/clients answered 400 `json: unknown field "ptr_suffixes"` to the
console's payload, because config.Group and config.Match carried yaml tags only
and the decoder runs with DisallowUnknownFields. Both structs have json tags
now; the same applies to config.UpstreamServer and UpstreamBootstrap.
PUT /api/upstreams answered 400 `json: unknown field "health"`, because the
console round-trips the whole server object it read, runtime health fields
included. They are accepted and ignored, because the server owns them, and they
are `yaml:"-"` so settings.yaml does not gain runtime state.
Also fixed, each with a test:
A duration on the wire was a nanosecond count. config.Duration had a
MarshalYAML but no MarshalJSON, so bootstraps[].refresh arrived as 30000000000
while the console typed the field as a string, and healthcheck_interval was a
float of seconds in one place and a string in another. Durations on the wire
are duration strings everywhere now — the same spelling config.yaml uses — and a
bare JSON number is still accepted and means seconds, not nanoseconds.
TestDurationJSONForm used to pin the old behaviour and now pins the new one,
saying in its comment that the old behaviour was the bug.
A log row's key set depended on the row. api.LogEntry was omitempty on
client_group, response, upstream and list, so a query with no ACL group
arrived without the key and the console rendered "undefined" where the column
should be empty. The contract test can only pin one shape if the server emits
one, so nothing on that struct is omitempty any more.
A dead peer stayed in the cluster peer list forever. Cluster.seen was only ever
added to and deleted from on an explicit `bye`, so a node that crashed — or
whose Valkey connection died — was reported as a live peer for the life of the
process, and its stale blocklist digest was flagged as divergence forever.
Peers() now reaps peers unheard for peer_ttl*4 and stamps each state with the
receiver's own clock, so clock skew between two machines can neither reap a
healthy peer nor keep a dead one. Discover() ages out the same way on the
publisher's own last_seen stamp, because the keyed Valkey record outlives a
crash: a live node keeps refreshing the key's TTL, so a dead node's field stayed
readable for the life of the fleet.
peer_ttl: 0 would have crashed the process. time.NewTicker(PeerTTL/2) panics on
a non-positive period and `EXPIRE key 0` deletes the heartbeat key, so a config
that left peer_ttl unset would have taken the process down at Start, or made
every instance believe it is alone in the fleet. Both go through peerTTL() and
peerDeadline(), which fall back to the default.
Two cluster tests raced on the wire, not on the product, and one was
environment-dependent rather than wrong. A node that joined after another's
heartbeat was in flight hears about it on the next tick, so "b does not see a"
read immediately after "a sees b" is a coin flip; the divergence test waited for
a digest on the wrong node's view of the fleet; and 127.0.0.1:1 is only
unbindable outside a container that sets
net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start=0, where it binds and the partial-bind test
fails with both transports up. That test now occupies a port with a live
listener in the test process, which is a deterministic EADDRINUSE on every
machine and every uid.
internal/server/counters_test.go covers the counter-key layer that no other
test touched: the "<transport>.<field>" keyspace, that the aggregate folds only
the known fields, and that the snapshot is safe while counters move.
Two pinned behaviours changed on purpose, each with a test that says so:
An RPZ record did not cover the name it names. rpzRule gave a bare owner name
the subdomain form (*.name), so analytics.example.org. in a policy zone blocked
cdn.analytics.example.org. and left analytics.example.org. resolving normally —
and an rpz-passthru. record did not allowlist its own domain either. RPZ
semantics say the record applies to the domain and everything under it, so a
bare owner now takes the apex form **.name; an owner written with an explicit *.
is still strict, so a zone that wants subdomain-only behaviour can still ask for
it. This changes which queries get blocked for an existing policy zone, which is
why it wanted a decision. TestExampleRPZZoneCoversTheApexItNames pins both
halves and the example zone now says which half it relies on.
metrics.OutcomeLocal had no producer. The engine reported a local-zone answer as
qlog.ActionAllow, which outcomeFor mapped to OutcomeUpstream, so every locally
answered query was counted as an upstream one and the outcome="local" series was
never published — the dashboard's local column was permanently empty.
Response.Local is now set on the local-zone path and outcomeFor consults it
first. That moves published counters, so the README's metrics section says so
too.
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e8c5b414d9 |
half broken
build / build-push (push) Failing after 23s
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48d37db15b |
Add the first internal/api test suite
build / build-push (push) Failing after 19s
internal/api is the admin REST + SSE surface and had no test file at all, so nothing pinned the auth modes, the X-Forwarded-For trust boundary, the rate limiter or the fact that a read route must not mutate anything. This adds a local harness (a Server over fake hooks on an httptest listener, with a real config file on disk) and three test files. What it pins: * Routing. A table over every route in Server.routes: each one answers 200 and reaches the hook it is supposed to, so a new route without a case here is a route nothing tests. Plus method-not-allowed / 404 / outside the base path, a base path other than /api, and a read-route sweep that asserts no mutating hook was reached, the config generation did not move and the file on disk is byte-identical afterwards. A panicking component becomes a 500 and the server keeps serving, because the admin API is the only way to fix a broken instance. * Auth. All three modes. apikey: the right key always works, and a prefix, a suffix, a case-folded key, a wrong basic password, an unknown bearer token, an unsupported scheme and a malformed Authorization header never do; curl -u any:KEY is accepted because that is what clients send. basic: bad username and bad password refused, a successful login issues a bearer token, the token works for the whole API, basic auth also works per request, an API key is not a credential in this mode, logout revokes the token, and a token past its session_ttl stops working. none: nothing is required and the caller runs as a writable loopback principal. trust _loopback: a local client with no credentials is let through, and a forwarded non-loopback client is not. Every mutating route refuses a read-only key with 403 without reaching its hook or touching the file (and the same request with a read-write key succeeds, so the 403 is about the key and not the payload), and allow_config_write: false refuses the settings editor with a valid key while the other mutations still work. The hashing is pinned on the state, not on timing: the authenticator's maps are keyed on the SHA-256 of the credential and hold no plaintext key or password, so a copied server struct cannot leak one. * Product code is untouched; the suite is `package api` with its own setup. |
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85453852d5 | initial commit |