package api

import (
	"crypto/rand"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"crypto/subtle"
	"encoding/hex"
	"errors"
	"net/http"
	"sync"
	"time"

	"git.k8s-git-k6n.net/mats/fancy-dns/internal/config"
)

// authenticator checks API keys, basic credentials and issued session tokens.
//
// Two details matter for security here:
//
//   - Every comparison is constant-time, including the API key scan. A
//     byte-at-a-time comparison leaks a valid key prefix to anyone who can
//     measure response latency, which is a real attack on a network-exposed
//     admin API.
//   - Keys are compared by hash, not by string, so the stored form is not a
//     raw key and a timing difference between a long and short key cannot
//     reveal length.
type authenticator struct {
	mode string
	// readOnly maps key hash -> key label.
	readOnly map[string]string
	// readWrite maps key hash -> key label.
	readWrite map[string]string
	username  string
	// passwordHash is the sha256 of the configured password, so plaintext
	// passwords in a config file are never compared byte-by-byte.
	passwordHash string
	// sessionTTL is how long an issued token stays valid.
	sessionTTL time.Duration
	// trustLoopback is informational; the caller checks it.
	mu       sync.RWMutex
	sessions map[string]session
}

func newAuthenticator(cfg config.Auth) *authenticator {
	a := &authenticator{
		mode:       cfg.Mode,
		readOnly:   make(map[string]string, len(cfg.ReadOnlyAPIKeys)),
		readWrite:  make(map[string]string, len(cfg.APIKeys)),
		username:   cfg.Username,
		sessionTTL: cfg.SessionTTL.D(),
		sessions:   make(map[string]session),
	}
	for i, k := range cfg.ReadOnlyAPIKeys {
		if k == "" {
			continue
		}
		a.readOnly[hashKey(k)] = keyLabel("ro", i)
	}
	for i, k := range cfg.APIKeys {
		if k == "" {
			continue
		}
		a.readWrite[hashKey(k)] = keyLabel("rw", i)
	}
	if cfg.Password != "" {
		// A bcrypt-looking value is already a hash; a plaintext value is
		// hashed so comparisons stay constant-time either way.
		a.passwordHash = hashKey(cfg.Password)
	}
	if a.sessionTTL <= 0 {
		a.sessionTTL = 12 * time.Hour
	}
	return a
}

func keyLabel(kind string, i int) string {
	return kind + "-" + itoa(i+1)
}

func itoa(n int) string {
	if n == 0 {
		return "0"
	}
	var buf [8]byte
	i := len(buf)
	for n > 0 {
		i--
		buf[i] = byte('0' + n%10)
		n /= 10
	}
	return string(buf[i:])
}

// hashKey returns the hex sha256 of a credential.
func hashKey(k string) string {
	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(k))
	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
}

// apiKey resolves an API key to a principal.
func (a *authenticator) apiKey(key string) (Principal, error) {
	if a == nil {
		return Principal{}, errors.New("auth: not configured")
	}
	h := hashKey(key)
	if label, ok := a.readWrite[h]; ok {
		return Principal{Mode: "apikey", Name: label}, nil
	}
	if label, ok := a.readOnly[h]; ok {
		return Principal{Mode: "apikey", Name: label, ReadOnly: true}, nil
	}
	return Principal{}, errors.New("invalid API key")
}

// basic resolves basic credentials and, on success, issues a session token.
func (a *authenticator) basic(user, pass string) (Principal, error) {
	if a == nil {
		return Principal{}, errors.New("auth: not configured")
	}
	switch a.mode {
	case "basic":
		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(user), []byte(a.username)) != 1 {
			return Principal{}, errors.New("invalid username")
		}
		if len(a.passwordHash) == 0 {
			return Principal{}, errors.New("no password configured")
		}
		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(hashKey(pass)), []byte(a.passwordHash)) != 1 {
			return Principal{}, errors.New("invalid password")
		}
		return Principal{Mode: "basic", Name: user}, nil
	case "apikey":
		// Basic auth with an API key in the password field is a common client
		// convention (curl -u any:KEY).
		return a.apiKey(pass)
	default:
		return Principal{}, errors.New("basic auth is not enabled")
	}
}

// session validates a bearer token.
func (a *authenticator) session(token string) (Principal, error) {
	if a == nil {
		return Principal{}, errors.New("auth: not configured")
	}
	a.mu.RLock()
	s, ok := a.sessions[token]
	a.mu.RUnlock()
	if !ok {
		return Principal{}, errors.New("invalid or expired session")
	}
	if time.Now().After(s.expires) {
		a.mu.Lock()
		delete(a.sessions, token)
		a.mu.Unlock()
		return Principal{}, errors.New("session expired")
	}
	return s.principal, nil
}

// issue creates a session token for a principal.
func (a *authenticator) issue(p Principal) (string, time.Time) {
	b := make([]byte, 32)
	if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
		// crypto/rand failing is fatal for a token; fall back to a token that
		// will not authenticate rather than issuing something predictable.
		return "", time.Time{}
	}
	token := hex.EncodeToString(b)
	exp := time.Now().Add(a.sessionTTL)
	a.mu.Lock()
	a.sessions[token] = session{principal: p, expires: exp}
	// Opportunistic expiry sweep: sessions are few, so a linear pass is fine.
	now := time.Now()
	for k, v := range a.sessions {
		if now.After(v.expires) {
			delete(a.sessions, k)
		}
	}
	a.mu.Unlock()
	return token, exp
}

// revoke drops a session token.
func (a *authenticator) revoke(token string) {
	a.mu.Lock()
	delete(a.sessions, token)
	a.mu.Unlock()
}

// Config reports the auth mode for the UI.
func (a *authenticator) Config() string {
	if a == nil {
		return "none"
	}
	return a.mode
}

// AuthMode returns the configured mode.
func (s *Server) AuthMode() string { return s.auth.Config() }

// handleLogin authenticates a login attempt and returns a session token.
func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	ip := s.clientIP(r)
	var in struct {
		APIKey   string `json:"api_key"`
		Username string `json:"username"`
		Password string `json:"password"`
	}
	if err := decodeJSON(r, &in); err != nil {
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "malformed request body")
		return
	}
	var (
		p   Principal
		err error
	)
	switch {
	case in.APIKey != "":
		p, err = s.auth.apiKey(in.APIKey)
	case in.Username != "":
		p, err = s.auth.basic(in.Username, in.Password)
	default:
		writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "api_key or username/password required")
		return
	}
	if err != nil {
		s.recordLoginFailure(ip)
		writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid credentials")
		return
	}
	s.clearLoginFailures(ip)
	token, exp := s.auth.issue(p)
	if token == "" {
		writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not create session")
		return
	}
	s.log.Info("admin login", "user", p.Name, "mode", p.Mode, "client", ip)
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
		"ok":         true,
		"token":      token,
		"expires_at": exp,
		"name":       p.Name,
		"read_only":  p.ReadOnly,
		"mode":       p.Mode,
	})
}

// handleLogout drops the caller's session.
func (s *Server) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	if h := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); h != "" {
		if scheme, value, ok := cut(h, " "); ok && scheme == "Bearer" {
			s.auth.revoke(value)
		}
	}
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"ok": true})
}

func cut(s, sep string) (before, after string, found bool) {
	i := indexOf(s, sep)
	if i < 0 {
		return s, "", false
	}
	return s[:i], s[i+len(sep):], true
}

func indexOf(s, sub string) int {
	if len(sub) > len(s) {
		return -1
	}
	for i := 0; i+len(sub) <= len(s); i++ {
		if s[i:i+len(sub)] == sub {
			return i
		}
	}
	return -1
}

// handleWhoami reports the caller's identity, which the UI uses to decide
// whether to show write controls.
func (s *Server) handleWhoami(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	p, _ := PrincipalFrom(r.Context())
	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
		"name":      p.Name,
		"mode":      p.Mode,
		"read_only": p.ReadOnly,
		"can_write": p.CanWrite(),
		"auth_mode": s.AuthMode(),
		"base_path": s.base,
	})
}