more customer

internal/customerauth/session.go

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+package customerauth
+
+import (
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// SessionCookieName is the name of the HttpOnly cookie that carries the signed
+// session token for a logged-in customer.
+const SessionCookieName = "sid"
+
+// DefaultSessionTTL is how long an issued session stays valid.
+const DefaultSessionTTL = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
+
+var (
+	// ErrInvalidToken is returned when a token is malformed or its signature
+	// does not verify.
+	ErrInvalidToken = errors.New("customerauth: invalid session token")
+	// ErrExpiredToken is returned when a token's signature is valid but it has
+	// passed its expiry.
+	ErrExpiredToken = errors.New("customerauth: expired session token")
+)
+
+// Signer issues and verifies session tokens using an HMAC-SHA256 key.
+type Signer struct {
+	secret []byte
+}
+
+// NewSigner returns a Signer over the given secret key bytes.
+func NewSigner(secret []byte) *Signer { return &Signer{secret: secret} }
+
+// token format: base64url(<profileID>.<expUnix>) "." base64url(hmac)
+// The payload is signed, not encrypted — it carries no secrets, only the
+// profile id and expiry, and the HMAC makes it tamper-evident.
+
+// Issue returns a signed token for profileID that expires after ttl.
+func (s *Signer) Issue(profileID uint64, ttl time.Duration) string {
+	exp := time.Now().Add(ttl).Unix()
+	payload := fmt.Sprintf("%d.%d", profileID, exp)
+	b := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(payload))
+	return b + "." + s.sign(b)
+}
+
+// Parse verifies a token and returns the profile id it carries. It returns
+// ErrInvalidToken for a bad signature/format and ErrExpiredToken when expired.
+func (s *Signer) Parse(token string) (uint64, error) {
+	b, sig, ok := strings.Cut(token, ".")
+	if !ok || b == "" || sig == "" {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	if !hmac.Equal([]byte(sig), []byte(s.sign(b))) {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	raw, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	idStr, expStr, ok := strings.Cut(string(raw), ".")
+	if !ok {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	id, err := strconv.ParseUint(idStr, 10, 64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	exp, err := strconv.ParseInt(expStr, 10, 64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	if time.Now().Unix() >= exp {
+		return 0, ErrExpiredToken
+	}
+	return id, nil
+}
+
+func (s *Signer) sign(b string) string {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.secret)
+	mac.Write([]byte(b))
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+// SetSession writes the session cookie for token onto w. The Secure flag is set
+// when the request arrived over TLS (directly or via an https-terminating
+// proxy) so the cookie still works on plain-http localhost in dev.
+func SetSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, token string, ttl time.Duration) {
+	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
+		Name:     SessionCookieName,
+		Value:    token,
+		Path:     "/",
+		HttpOnly: true,
+		Secure:   isSecure(r),
+		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
+		Expires:  time.Now().Add(ttl),
+		MaxAge:   int(ttl.Seconds()),
+	})
+}
+
+// ClearSession expires the session cookie on w.
+func ClearSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
+		Name:     SessionCookieName,
+		Value:    "",
+		Path:     "/",
+		HttpOnly: true,
+		Secure:   isSecure(r),
+		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
+		MaxAge:   -1,
+	})
+}
+
+func isSecure(r *http.Request) bool {
+	if r.TLS != nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	return strings.EqualFold(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"), "https")
+}