more customer

cmd/checkout/pool-server.go

@@ -239,15 +239,13 @@ func (s *CheckoutPoolServer) StartCheckoutHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Create checkout with same ID as cart
+	// The checkout grain is 1:1 with the cart it checks out (CheckoutId ==
-	var checkoutId checkout.CheckoutId = cart.MustNewCartId()
+	// CartId). Keying it by the cart id — not a lingering checkoutid cookie —
-	cookie, err := r.Cookie(checkoutCookieName)
+	// means a fresh cart always gets a fresh checkout, so the Klarna order
-	if err == nil {
+	// reflects the cart shown at /kassa. Reusing the cookie made a new cart's
-		parsed, ok := cart.ParseCartId(cookie.Value)
+	// checkout latch onto a previous cart's frozen snapshot (InitializeCheckout
-		if ok {
+	// silently refuses to re-snapshot a grain that already has a CartState).
-			checkoutId = parsed
+	checkoutId := checkout.CheckoutId(cartId)
-		}
-	}
 
 	// Initialize checkout with cart state wrapped in Any
 	cartStateAny := &messages.InitializeCheckout{

cmd/profile/main.go

@@ -2,20 +2,39 @@ package main
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/hex"
 	"fmt"
 	"log"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"time"
 
+	"git.k6n.net/mats/go-cart-actor/internal/customerauth"
 	"git.k6n.net/mats/go-cart-actor/internal/ucp"
 	"git.k6n.net/mats/go-cart-actor/pkg/actor"
 	"git.k6n.net/mats/go-cart-actor/pkg/profile"
 	"go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp"
 )
 
+// authSecret returns the HMAC key for customer session cookies. It reads
+// CUSTOMER_AUTH_SECRET; when unset it generates an ephemeral random key and
+// warns that issued sessions will not survive a restart (fine for dev).
+func authSecret() []byte {
+	if v := os.Getenv("CUSTOMER_AUTH_SECRET"); v != "" {
+		return []byte(v)
+	}
+	b := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("could not generate auth secret: %v", err)
+	}
+	log.Print("warning: CUSTOMER_AUTH_SECRET unset — using an ephemeral key; customer sessions will not survive a restart")
+	return []byte(hex.EncodeToString(b))
+}
+
 var podIp = os.Getenv("POD_IP")
 var name = os.Getenv("POD_NAME")
 
@@ -64,6 +83,9 @@ func main() {
 			err := diskStorage.LoadEvents(ctx, id, ret)
 			return ret, err
 		},
+		// Destroy is an optional grain-eviction cleanup hook; profiles need none
+		// (disk storage persists via its own loop), so it's left unset — purge()
+		// skips a nil Destroy.
 		TTL:      10 * time.Minute,
 		PoolSize: 65535,
 		Hostname: podIp,
@@ -96,6 +118,14 @@ func main() {
 	// passes the full request path without stripping the prefix.
 	mux.Handle("/ucp/v1/customers/", http.StripPrefix("/ucp/v1/customers", customerUCP))
 
+	// Customer auth: password signup/login + session cookies + identity linking.
+	credStore, err := customerauth.LoadCredentialStore(filepath.Join(profileDir, "credentials.json"))
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatalf("Error loading credential store: %v\n", err)
+	}
+	authHandler := customerauth.NewServer(credStore, pool, customerauth.NewSigner(authSecret()), 0).Handler()
+	mux.Handle("/ucp/v1/auth/", http.StripPrefix("/ucp/v1/auth", authHandler))
+
 	mux.HandleFunc("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		grainCount, capacity := pool.LocalUsage()
 		if grainCount >= capacity {
@@ -126,7 +156,7 @@ func main() {
 	})
 
 	srv := &http.Server{
-		Addr:         ":8080",
+		Addr:         getEnv("PROFILE_ADDR", ":8080"),
 		BaseContext:  func(net.Listener) context.Context { return ctx },
 		ReadTimeout:  10 * time.Second,
 		WriteTimeout: 20 * time.Second,

internal/customerauth/customerauth_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+package customerauth
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func TestPasswordRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	h, err := HashPassword("correct horse battery staple")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("hash: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !VerifyPassword("correct horse battery staple", h) {
+		t.Fatal("correct password did not verify")
+	}
+	if VerifyPassword("wrong", h) {
+		t.Fatal("wrong password verified")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPasswordHashesAreSalted(t *testing.T) {
+	a, _ := HashPassword("hunter2hunter2")
+	b, _ := HashPassword("hunter2hunter2")
+	if a == b {
+		t.Fatal("two hashes of the same password are identical — not salted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestVerifyRejectsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, bad := range []string{"", "x", "pbkdf2-sha256$abc$salt$hash", "md5$1$a$b"} {
+		if VerifyPassword("whatever", bad) {
+			t.Fatalf("malformed hash %q verified", bad)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSessionRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	s := NewSigner([]byte("test-secret"))
+	tok := s.Issue(12345, time.Hour)
+	id, err := s.Parse(tok)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("parse: %v", err)
+	}
+	if id != 12345 {
+		t.Fatalf("got id %d, want 12345", id)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSessionExpired(t *testing.T) {
+	s := NewSigner([]byte("test-secret"))
+	tok := s.Issue(1, -time.Second)
+	if _, err := s.Parse(tok); err != ErrExpiredToken {
+		t.Fatalf("got %v, want ErrExpiredToken", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSessionTamperAndWrongKey(t *testing.T) {
+	s := NewSigner([]byte("test-secret"))
+	tok := s.Issue(7, time.Hour)
+	if _, err := s.Parse(tok + "x"); err != ErrInvalidToken {
+		t.Fatalf("tampered token: got %v, want ErrInvalidToken", err)
+	}
+	other := NewSigner([]byte("different-secret"))
+	if _, err := other.Parse(tok); err != ErrInvalidToken {
+		t.Fatalf("wrong key: got %v, want ErrInvalidToken", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStoreRegisterDuplicateAndReload(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "credentials.json")
+	store, err := LoadCredentialStore(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := store.Register("User@Example.com", 42, "hash1", "ts"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("register: %v", err)
+	}
+	// Duplicate (case-insensitive) is rejected.
+	if err := store.Register("user@example.com", 99, "hash2", "ts"); err != ErrEmailExists {
+		t.Fatalf("duplicate: got %v, want ErrEmailExists", err)
+	}
+	// Reload from disk and confirm the record persisted.
+	reloaded, err := LoadCredentialStore(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reload: %v", err)
+	}
+	rec, ok := reloaded.Get("USER@EXAMPLE.COM")
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatal("record not found after reload")
+	}
+	if rec.ProfileID != 42 || rec.Hash != "hash1" {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected record: %+v", rec)
+	}
+}

internal/customerauth/password.go

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+// Package customerauth adds password-based signup/login to the profile service.
+//
+// It deliberately uses only the standard library: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 for
+// password hashing (crypto/pbkdf2, Go 1.24+) and HMAC-SHA256-signed cookies for
+// sessions (crypto/hmac). No password ever leaves the server in plaintext and
+// the session token is opaque + tamper-evident.
+package customerauth
+
+import (
+	"crypto/pbkdf2"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"fmt"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// pbkdf2Iterations is the work factor for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256. 210_000 matches
+// the current OWASP recommendation for PBKDF2-SHA256.
+const pbkdf2Iterations = 210_000
+
+const (
+	saltLen = 16
+	keyLen  = 32
+)
+
+// HashPassword returns an encoded PBKDF2 hash of the form
+//
+//	pbkdf2-sha256$<iterations>$<saltB64>$<hashB64>
+//
+// with a fresh random salt. The encoded string is self-describing so Verify can
+// read the parameters back without external configuration.
+func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
+	salt := make([]byte, saltLen)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("customerauth: read salt: %w", err)
+	}
+	dk, err := pbkdf2.Key(sha256.New, password, salt, pbkdf2Iterations, keyLen)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("customerauth: pbkdf2: %w", err)
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("pbkdf2-sha256$%d$%s$%s",
+		pbkdf2Iterations,
+		base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(salt),
+		base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(dk),
+	), nil
+}
+
+// VerifyPassword reports whether password matches the encoded hash. It is
+// constant-time in the hash comparison and returns false for any malformed
+// encoding rather than erroring, so callers can treat it as a simple predicate.
+func VerifyPassword(password, encoded string) bool {
+	parts := strings.Split(encoded, "$")
+	if len(parts) != 4 || parts[0] != "pbkdf2-sha256" {
+		return false
+	}
+	iter, err := strconv.Atoi(parts[1])
+	if err != nil || iter <= 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	salt, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	want, err := base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(parts[3])
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	got, err := pbkdf2.Key(sha256.New, password, salt, iter, len(want))
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(got, want) == 1
+}

internal/customerauth/server.go

@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+package customerauth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/mail"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.k6n.net/mats/go-cart-actor/pkg/actor"
+	"git.k6n.net/mats/go-cart-actor/pkg/profile"
+	messages "git.k6n.net/mats/go-cart-actor/proto/profile"
+	"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
+)
+
+// minPasswordLen is the minimum accepted password length at registration.
+const minPasswordLen = 8
+
+// ProfileApplier is the subset of the profile grain pool the auth server needs.
+// The pool (and the UCP adapter's ProfileApplier) already satisfies it.
+type ProfileApplier interface {
+	Get(ctx context.Context, id uint64) (*profile.ProfileGrain, error)
+	Apply(ctx context.Context, id uint64, mutation ...proto.Message) (*actor.MutationResult[profile.ProfileGrain], error)
+}
+
+// Server exposes password signup/login and identity-linking over HTTP, backed
+// by the credential store (email→id+hash) and the profile grain pool.
+type Server struct {
+	store   *CredentialStore
+	applier ProfileApplier
+	signer  *Signer
+	ttl     time.Duration
+}
+
+// NewServer builds an auth server. ttl<=0 falls back to DefaultSessionTTL.
+func NewServer(store *CredentialStore, applier ProfileApplier, signer *Signer, ttl time.Duration) *Server {
+	if ttl <= 0 {
+		ttl = DefaultSessionTTL
+	}
+	return &Server{store: store, applier: applier, signer: signer, ttl: ttl}
+}
+
+// Handler returns the router for the auth endpoints. Mount it under /ucp/v1/auth
+// (the prefix is stripped by the caller).
+func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /register", s.handleRegister)
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /login", s.handleLogin)
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /logout", s.handleLogout)
+	mux.HandleFunc("GET /me", s.handleMe)
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /link-cart", s.handleLinkCart)
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /link-checkout", s.handleLinkCheckout)
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /link-order", s.handleLinkOrder)
+	return mux
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Request/response payloads
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+type registerRequest struct {
+	Email    string `json:"email"`
+	Password string `json:"password"`
+	Name     string `json:"name,omitempty"`
+	Phone    string `json:"phone,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type loginRequest struct {
+	Email    string `json:"email"`
+	Password string `json:"password"`
+}
+
+type linkCartRequest struct {
+	CartID string `json:"cartId"`
+}
+
+type linkCheckoutRequest struct {
+	CheckoutID string `json:"checkoutId"`
+	CartID     string `json:"cartId"`
+}
+
+type linkOrderRequest struct {
+	OrderReference string `json:"orderReference"`
+	CartID         string `json:"cartId"`
+	Status         string `json:"status,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// CustomerResponse mirrors the UCP customer projection (kept local to avoid an
+// import cycle with internal/ucp). The password hash is never included.
+type CustomerResponse struct {
+	ID        string            `json:"id"`
+	Name      string            `json:"name,omitempty"`
+	Email     string            `json:"email,omitempty"`
+	Phone     string            `json:"phone,omitempty"`
+	Language  string            `json:"language,omitempty"`
+	Currency  string            `json:"currency,omitempty"`
+	AvatarURL string            `json:"avatarUrl,omitempty"`
+	Addresses []AddressResponse `json:"addresses"`
+	Orders    []OrderRef        `json:"orders"`
+}
+
+type AddressResponse struct {
+	ID                uint32 `json:"id"`
+	Label             string `json:"label,omitempty"`
+	FullName          string `json:"fullName,omitempty"`
+	AddressLine1      string `json:"addressLine1"`
+	AddressLine2      string `json:"addressLine2,omitempty"`
+	City              string `json:"city"`
+	Zip               string `json:"zip"`
+	Country           string `json:"country"`
+	IsDefaultShipping bool   `json:"isDefaultShipping,omitempty"`
+	IsDefaultBilling  bool   `json:"isDefaultBilling,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type OrderRef struct {
+	OrderReference string `json:"orderReference"`
+	Status         string `json:"status,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Handlers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+func (s *Server) handleRegister(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	var req registerRequest
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
+		return
+	}
+	email := NormalizeEmail(req.Email)
+	if !validEmail(email) {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "a valid email is required")
+		return
+	}
+	if len(req.Password) < minPasswordLen {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "password must be at least 8 characters")
+		return
+	}
+	if _, exists := s.store.Get(email); exists {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusConflict, "an account with this email already exists")
+		return
+	}
+
+	hash, err := HashPassword(req.Password)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not hash password")
+		return
+	}
+
+	rawID, err := profile.NewProfileId()
+	if err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not generate id")
+		return
+	}
+	id := uint64(rawID)
+
+	set := &messages.SetProfile{Email: &email}
+	if req.Name != "" {
+		set.Name = &req.Name
+	}
+	if req.Phone != "" {
+		set.Phone = &req.Phone
+	}
+	if _, err := s.applier.Apply(r.Context(), id, set); err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not create profile")
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Persist the credential only after the profile is created. If this fails
+	// the profile exists but is unreachable by login — acceptable and rare.
+	if err := s.store.Register(email, id, hash, time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)); err != nil {
+		if err == ErrEmailExists {
+			writeErr(w, http.StatusConflict, "an account with this email already exists")
+			return
+		}
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not store credentials")
+		return
+	}
+
+	s.issueSession(w, r, id)
+	s.writeCustomer(w, r, http.StatusCreated, rawID.String(), id)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	var req loginRequest
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
+		return
+	}
+	rec, ok := s.store.Get(req.Email)
+	// Always run a verify (even on miss, against the stored hash if present) and
+	// return a single generic error so the response does not reveal whether the
+	// email exists.
+	if !ok || !VerifyPassword(req.Password, rec.Hash) {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid email or password")
+		return
+	}
+	s.issueSession(w, r, rec.ProfileID)
+	s.writeCustomer(w, r, http.StatusOK, profile.ProfileId(rec.ProfileID).String(), rec.ProfileID)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	ClearSession(w, r)
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
+}
+
+func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	id, ok := s.requireSession(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	s.writeCustomer(w, r, http.StatusOK, profile.ProfileId(id).String(), id)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) handleLinkCart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	id, ok := s.requireSession(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	var req linkCartRequest
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
+		return
+	}
+	cartID, ok := parseBase62(req.CartID)
+	if !ok {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid cartId")
+		return
+	}
+	if _, err := s.applier.Apply(r.Context(), id, &messages.LinkCart{CartId: cartID, Label: "current cart"}); err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not link cart")
+		return
+	}
+	s.writeCustomer(w, r, http.StatusOK, profile.ProfileId(id).String(), id)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) handleLinkCheckout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	id, ok := s.requireSession(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	var req linkCheckoutRequest
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
+		return
+	}
+	checkoutID, ok := parseBase62(req.CheckoutID)
+	if !ok {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid checkoutId")
+		return
+	}
+	cartID, _ := parseBase62(req.CartID)
+	if _, err := s.applier.Apply(r.Context(), id, &messages.LinkCheckout{CheckoutId: checkoutID, CartId: cartID}); err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not link checkout")
+		return
+	}
+	s.writeCustomer(w, r, http.StatusOK, profile.ProfileId(id).String(), id)
+}
+
+func (s *Server) handleLinkOrder(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	id, ok := s.requireSession(w, r)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	var req linkOrderRequest
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
+		return
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(req.OrderReference) == "" {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "orderReference is required")
+		return
+	}
+	cartID, _ := parseBase62(req.CartID)
+	if _, err := s.applier.Apply(r.Context(), id, &messages.LinkOrder{
+		OrderReference: req.OrderReference,
+		CartId:         cartID,
+		Status:         req.Status,
+	}); err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not link order")
+		return
+	}
+	s.writeCustomer(w, r, http.StatusOK, profile.ProfileId(id).String(), id)
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Helpers
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+func (s *Server) issueSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, id uint64) {
+	SetSession(w, r, s.signer.Issue(id, s.ttl), s.ttl)
+}
+
+// requireSession reads and validates the session cookie, writing 401 on
+// failure. It returns the profile id and whether a valid session was present.
+func (s *Server) requireSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (uint64, bool) {
+	c, err := r.Cookie(SessionCookieName)
+	if err != nil || c.Value == "" {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	id, err := s.signer.Parse(c.Value)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "not authenticated")
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	return id, true
+}
+
+// writeCustomer loads the profile grain and writes it as a CustomerResponse.
+func (s *Server) writeCustomer(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, status int, idStr string, id uint64) {
+	g, err := s.applier.Get(r.Context(), id)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not read profile")
+		return
+	}
+	writeJSON(w, status, grainToCustomer(idStr, g))
+}
+
+func grainToCustomer(id string, g *profile.ProfileGrain) CustomerResponse {
+	resp := CustomerResponse{
+		ID:        id,
+		Name:      g.Name,
+		Email:     g.Email,
+		Phone:     g.Phone,
+		Language:  g.Language,
+		Currency:  g.Currency,
+		AvatarURL: g.AvatarUrl,
+		Addresses: make([]AddressResponse, 0, len(g.Addresses)),
+		Orders:    make([]OrderRef, 0, len(g.Orders)),
+	}
+	for _, a := range g.Addresses {
+		resp.Addresses = append(resp.Addresses, AddressResponse{
+			ID:                a.Id,
+			Label:             a.Label,
+			FullName:          a.FullName,
+			AddressLine1:      a.AddressLine1,
+			AddressLine2:      a.AddressLine2,
+			City:              a.City,
+			Zip:               a.Zip,
+			Country:           a.Country,
+			IsDefaultShipping: a.IsDefaultShipping,
+			IsDefaultBilling:  a.IsDefaultBilling,
+		})
+	}
+	for _, o := range g.Orders {
+		resp.Orders = append(resp.Orders, OrderRef{OrderReference: o.OrderReference, Status: o.Status})
+	}
+	return resp
+}
+
+// parseBase62 decodes a base62 id (cart/checkout/profile share the scheme).
+func parseBase62(s string) (uint64, bool) {
+	if s == "" {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	id, ok := profile.ParseProfileId(s)
+	return uint64(id), ok
+}
+
+func validEmail(email string) bool {
+	if email == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	_, err := mail.ParseAddress(email)
+	return err == nil
+}
+
+func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
+	w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	w.WriteHeader(status)
+	_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
+}
+
+func writeErr(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) {
+	writeJSON(w, status, map[string]string{"error": msg})
+}

internal/customerauth/session.go

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+package customerauth
+
+import (
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// SessionCookieName is the name of the HttpOnly cookie that carries the signed
+// session token for a logged-in customer.
+const SessionCookieName = "sid"
+
+// DefaultSessionTTL is how long an issued session stays valid.
+const DefaultSessionTTL = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
+
+var (
+	// ErrInvalidToken is returned when a token is malformed or its signature
+	// does not verify.
+	ErrInvalidToken = errors.New("customerauth: invalid session token")
+	// ErrExpiredToken is returned when a token's signature is valid but it has
+	// passed its expiry.
+	ErrExpiredToken = errors.New("customerauth: expired session token")
+)
+
+// Signer issues and verifies session tokens using an HMAC-SHA256 key.
+type Signer struct {
+	secret []byte
+}
+
+// NewSigner returns a Signer over the given secret key bytes.
+func NewSigner(secret []byte) *Signer { return &Signer{secret: secret} }
+
+// token format: base64url(<profileID>.<expUnix>) "." base64url(hmac)
+// The payload is signed, not encrypted — it carries no secrets, only the
+// profile id and expiry, and the HMAC makes it tamper-evident.
+
+// Issue returns a signed token for profileID that expires after ttl.
+func (s *Signer) Issue(profileID uint64, ttl time.Duration) string {
+	exp := time.Now().Add(ttl).Unix()
+	payload := fmt.Sprintf("%d.%d", profileID, exp)
+	b := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(payload))
+	return b + "." + s.sign(b)
+}
+
+// Parse verifies a token and returns the profile id it carries. It returns
+// ErrInvalidToken for a bad signature/format and ErrExpiredToken when expired.
+func (s *Signer) Parse(token string) (uint64, error) {
+	b, sig, ok := strings.Cut(token, ".")
+	if !ok || b == "" || sig == "" {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	if !hmac.Equal([]byte(sig), []byte(s.sign(b))) {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	raw, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	idStr, expStr, ok := strings.Cut(string(raw), ".")
+	if !ok {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	id, err := strconv.ParseUint(idStr, 10, 64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	exp, err := strconv.ParseInt(expStr, 10, 64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, ErrInvalidToken
+	}
+	if time.Now().Unix() >= exp {
+		return 0, ErrExpiredToken
+	}
+	return id, nil
+}
+
+func (s *Signer) sign(b string) string {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.secret)
+	mac.Write([]byte(b))
+	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+// SetSession writes the session cookie for token onto w. The Secure flag is set
+// when the request arrived over TLS (directly or via an https-terminating
+// proxy) so the cookie still works on plain-http localhost in dev.
+func SetSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, token string, ttl time.Duration) {
+	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
+		Name:     SessionCookieName,
+		Value:    token,
+		Path:     "/",
+		HttpOnly: true,
+		Secure:   isSecure(r),
+		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
+		Expires:  time.Now().Add(ttl),
+		MaxAge:   int(ttl.Seconds()),
+	})
+}
+
+// ClearSession expires the session cookie on w.
+func ClearSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
+		Name:     SessionCookieName,
+		Value:    "",
+		Path:     "/",
+		HttpOnly: true,
+		Secure:   isSecure(r),
+		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
+		MaxAge:   -1,
+	})
+}
+
+func isSecure(r *http.Request) bool {
+	if r.TLS != nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	return strings.EqualFold(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"), "https")
+}

internal/customerauth/store.go

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+package customerauth
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+// ErrEmailExists is returned by Register when the (normalized) email is already
+// associated with a credential record.
+var ErrEmailExists = errors.New("customerauth: email already registered")
+
+// Record is a single stored credential: which profile an email belongs to and
+// its password hash. It deliberately does not embed any profile data — the
+// profile grain remains the source of truth for that.
+type Record struct {
+	Email     string `json:"email"`
+	ProfileID uint64 `json:"profileId"`
+	Hash      string `json:"hash"`
+	CreatedAt string `json:"createdAt,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// CredentialStore is a small email→credential index persisted to a JSON file.
+// It is the email lookup that the event-sourced profile grains intentionally
+// lack. Concurrency-safe; writes are atomic (temp file + rename).
+type CredentialStore struct {
+	mu     sync.RWMutex
+	path   string
+	byMail map[string]Record // key: normalized email
+}
+
+// LoadCredentialStore opens (or initializes) the store backed by path. A
+// missing file is treated as an empty store; the file is created on first write.
+func LoadCredentialStore(path string) (*CredentialStore, error) {
+	s := &CredentialStore{path: path, byMail: make(map[string]Record)}
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
+			return s, nil
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("customerauth: read %s: %w", path, err)
+	}
+	var records []Record
+	if len(data) > 0 {
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &records); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("customerauth: parse %s: %w", path, err)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, r := range records {
+		s.byMail[NormalizeEmail(r.Email)] = r
+	}
+	return s, nil
+}
+
+// NormalizeEmail lower-cases and trims an email for use as a lookup key.
+func NormalizeEmail(email string) string {
+	return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(email))
+}
+
+// Get returns the record for email and whether it exists.
+func (s *CredentialStore) Get(email string) (Record, bool) {
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	defer s.mu.RUnlock()
+	r, ok := s.byMail[NormalizeEmail(email)]
+	return r, ok
+}
+
+// Register adds a new credential record and persists the store. It returns
+// ErrEmailExists if the email is already taken.
+func (s *CredentialStore) Register(email string, profileID uint64, hash, createdAt string) error {
+	key := NormalizeEmail(email)
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if _, exists := s.byMail[key]; exists {
+		return ErrEmailExists
+	}
+	s.byMail[key] = Record{Email: key, ProfileID: profileID, Hash: hash, CreatedAt: createdAt}
+	return s.persistLocked()
+}
+
+// persistLocked writes the whole store to disk atomically. Caller holds s.mu.
+func (s *CredentialStore) persistLocked() error {
+	records := make([]Record, 0, len(s.byMail))
+	for _, r := range s.byMail {
+		records = append(records, r)
+	}
+	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(records, "", "  ")
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("customerauth: marshal store: %w", err)
+	}
+	if dir := filepath.Dir(s.path); dir != "" {
+		if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0o755); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("customerauth: mkdir %s: %w", dir, err)
+		}
+	}
+	tmp, err := os.CreateTemp(filepath.Dir(s.path), ".credentials-*.tmp")
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("customerauth: temp file: %w", err)
+	}
+	tmpName := tmp.Name()
+	if _, err := tmp.Write(data); err != nil {
+		tmp.Close()
+		os.Remove(tmpName)
+		return fmt.Errorf("customerauth: write temp: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := tmp.Close(); err != nil {
+		os.Remove(tmpName)
+		return fmt.Errorf("customerauth: close temp: %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := os.Rename(tmpName, s.path); err != nil {
+		os.Remove(tmpName)
+		return fmt.Errorf("customerauth: rename temp: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}

pkg/actor/simple_grain_pool.go

@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ type GrainPoolConfig[V any] struct {
 	Hostname         string
 	Spawn            func(ctx context.Context, id uint64) (Grain[V], error)
 	SpawnHost        func(host string) (Host[V], error)
+	// Destroy is an optional cleanup hook called when a grain is evicted on TTL
+	// (e.g. to detach inventory subscriptions wired into its mutations). Leave
+	// nil when there is nothing to clean up — purge() skips a nil Destroy.
 	Destroy          func(grain Grain[V]) error
 	TTL              time.Duration
 	PoolSize         int
@@ -96,9 +99,11 @@ func (p *SimpleGrainPool[V]) purge() {
 	for id, grain := range p.grains {
 		if grain.GetLastAccess().Before(purgeLimit) {
 			purgedIds = append(purgedIds, id)
+			if p.destroy != nil {
 				if err := p.destroy(grain); err != nil {
 					log.Printf("failed to destroy grain %d: %v", id, err)
 				}
+			}
 
 			delete(p.grains, id)
 		}