314 lines
9.4 KiB
Go
314 lines
9.4 KiB
Go
// Package honeypot tracks common vulnerability-scanner requests and serves an
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// inert decoy response. Its promoted IP list can be consumed by an ingress
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// controller or a separate synchronizer.
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package honeypot
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import (
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/json"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/netip"
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"os"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"git.tornberg.me/go-otel/internal/triage"
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)
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const (
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defaultThreshold = 3
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defaultWindow = 15 * time.Minute
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defaultTTL = 1 * time.Hour
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maxTracked = 10000
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maxPathsTracked = 64
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)
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type Config struct {
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Threshold int
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Window time.Duration
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TTL time.Duration
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Delay time.Duration
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Token string
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// MinPaths is how many distinct suspicious paths an IP must request
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// before it is promoted. A legitimate client repeatedly fetching one
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// odd path (a manifest.json) is not a scanner. Zero means 1.
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MinPaths int
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}
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type entry struct {
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Paths map[string]struct{}
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Count int
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FirstSeen time.Time
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LastSeen time.Time
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PromotedUntil time.Time
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}
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// IP describes an IP promoted for ingress honeypot routing.
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type IP struct {
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Address string `json:"ip"`
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Count int `json:"count"`
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Paths int `json:"paths"`
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FirstSeen time.Time `json:"first_seen"`
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LastSeen time.Time `json:"last_seen"`
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PromotedUntil time.Time `json:"promoted_until"`
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}
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type Tracker struct {
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threshold int
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window time.Duration
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ttl time.Duration
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delay time.Duration
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token string
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minPaths int
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mu sync.Mutex
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clients map[string]entry
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}
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func New(cfg Config) *Tracker {
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if cfg.Threshold <= 0 {
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cfg.Threshold = defaultThreshold
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}
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if cfg.Window <= 0 {
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cfg.Window = defaultWindow
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}
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if cfg.TTL <= 0 {
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cfg.TTL = defaultTTL
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}
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if cfg.Delay < 0 {
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cfg.Delay = 0
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}
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if cfg.Delay > 10*time.Second {
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cfg.Delay = 10 * time.Second
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}
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if cfg.MinPaths < 1 {
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cfg.MinPaths = 1
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}
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return &Tracker{threshold: cfg.Threshold, window: cfg.Window, ttl: cfg.TTL, delay: cfg.Delay, token: cfg.Token, minPaths: cfg.MinPaths, clients: make(map[string]entry)}
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}
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func ConfigFromEnv() Config {
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cfg := Config{Threshold: defaultThreshold, Window: defaultWindow, TTL: defaultTTL, Delay: 0, Token: os.Getenv("OTEL_HONEYPOT_TOKEN"), MinPaths: 3}
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if n, err := strconv.Atoi(os.Getenv("OTEL_HONEYPOT_MIN_PATHS")); err == nil && n > 0 {
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cfg.MinPaths = n
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}
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if n, err := strconv.Atoi(os.Getenv("OTEL_HONEYPOT_THRESHOLD")); err == nil && n > 0 {
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cfg.Threshold = n
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}
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if d, err := time.ParseDuration(os.Getenv("OTEL_HONEYPOT_WINDOW")); err == nil && d > 0 {
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cfg.Window = d
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}
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if d, err := time.ParseDuration(os.Getenv("OTEL_HONEYPOT_TTL")); err == nil && d > 0 {
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cfg.TTL = d
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}
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if d, err := time.ParseDuration(os.Getenv("OTEL_HONEYPOT_DELAY")); err == nil && d >= 0 {
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cfg.Delay = d
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}
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return cfg
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}
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// Middleware records scanner paths and returns decoys. All other requests
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// continue to the wrapped application unchanged.
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func (t *Tracker) Middleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !isSuspiciousPath(r.URL.Path) {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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ip := clientIP(r)
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promoted := t.record(ip, r.URL.Path)
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if promoted && t.delay > 0 {
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timer := time.NewTimer(t.delay)
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select {
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case <-timer.C:
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case <-r.Context().Done():
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if !timer.Stop() {
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<-timer.C
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}
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return
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}
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
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w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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if strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(r.URL.Path), ".env") {
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("# decoy configuration - no real secrets\nAPP_ENV=production\nAPP_DEBUG=false\nDB_HOST=127.0.0.1\nDB_DATABASE=example_decoy\nDB_USERNAME=decoy_reader\nDB_PASSWORD=not-a-real-password\n"))
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return
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}
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte("-- decoy diagnostic response\n-- no database connection was made\n-- DROP TABLE users;\n-- DROP TABLE sessions;\n-- inert text only\n"))
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})
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}
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// Untrackable reports addresses that must never be tracked or blocked:
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// loopback, private, link-local, multicast, unspecified or unparsable. Behind
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// a proxy hop the observed peer is often 127.0.0.1 or a node address, and
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// promoting it would cut off the ingress itself.
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func Untrackable(ip string) bool {
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addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(ip))
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if err != nil {
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return true
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}
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addr = addr.Unmap()
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if addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate() || addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || addr.IsUnspecified() || addr.IsMulticast() {
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return true
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}
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for _, p := range reservedPrefixes {
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if p.Contains(addr) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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// reservedPrefixes are ranges the standard library helpers do not cover but
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// that are never a remote scanner: carrier-grade NAT (also used by Tailscale
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// and mobile carriers), IETF protocol assignments, benchmarking, and the
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// reserved/broadcast block.
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var reservedPrefixes = []netip.Prefix{
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netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.0/10"),
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netip.MustParsePrefix("192.0.0.0/24"),
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netip.MustParsePrefix("198.18.0.0/15"),
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netip.MustParsePrefix("240.0.0.0/4"),
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}
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func (t *Tracker) record(ip, path string) bool {
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if Untrackable(ip) {
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return false
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}
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now := time.Now()
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t.mu.Lock()
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defer t.mu.Unlock()
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state, ok := t.clients[ip]
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if !ok || now.Sub(state.LastSeen) > t.window {
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state = entry{FirstSeen: now, Paths: map[string]struct{}{}}
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}
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state.Count++
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state.LastSeen = now
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if len(state.Paths) < maxPathsTracked {
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state.Paths[strings.ToLower(path)] = struct{}{}
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}
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if state.Count >= t.threshold && len(state.Paths) >= t.minPaths {
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state.PromotedUntil = now.Add(t.ttl)
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}
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t.clients[ip] = state
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if len(t.clients) > maxTracked {
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t.evictOldest()
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}
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return !state.PromotedUntil.IsZero() && now.Before(state.PromotedUntil)
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}
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// RecordTelemetry records a suspicious request observed in an OTLP span. This
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// is separate from Middleware because the request may have been handled by a
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// different application/ingress host while its telemetry is sent to this
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// collector. No decoy response is written here; this only updates the
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// promoted-IP feed.
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func (t *Tracker) RecordTelemetry(ip, path string) bool {
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ip = strings.TrimSpace(strings.SplitN(ip, ",", 2)[0])
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if ip == "" || !(isSuspiciousPath(path) || triage.IsProbePath(path)) {
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return false
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}
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return t.record(ip, path)
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}
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// PromotedIPs returns a snapshot suitable for an ingress synchronizer.
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func (t *Tracker) PromotedIPs() []IP {
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now := time.Now()
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t.mu.Lock()
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defer t.mu.Unlock()
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result := make([]IP, 0)
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for address, state := range t.clients {
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if state.PromotedUntil.IsZero() || !now.Before(state.PromotedUntil) {
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continue
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}
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result = append(result, IP{Address: address, Count: state.Count, Paths: len(state.Paths), FirstSeen: state.FirstSeen, LastSeen: state.LastSeen, PromotedUntil: state.PromotedUntil})
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}
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return result
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}
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// HandleIPs exposes the promoted list only when OTEL_HONEYPOT_TOKEN is set.
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// It is intended for a private ingress-side synchronizer, not public clients.
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func (t *Tracker) HandleIPs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodGet || t.token == "" || !validToken(r, t.token) {
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w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer realm="honeypot"`)
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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t.writeIPs(w)
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}
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// HandleIPsForUser is used behind the application's normal authenticated UI
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// middleware. The internal machine endpoint remains protected by Token.
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func (t *Tracker) HandleIPsForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
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http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
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return
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}
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t.writeIPs(w)
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}
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func (t *Tracker) writeIPs(w http.ResponseWriter) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(t.PromotedIPs())
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}
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func validToken(r *http.Request, token string) bool {
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value := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(r.Header.Get("Authorization"), "Bearer "))
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if value == "" {
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value = r.Header.Get("X-Honeypot-Token")
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}
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return len(value) == len(token) && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(value), []byte(token)) == 1
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}
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func (t *Tracker) evictOldest() {
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var address string
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var oldest time.Time
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for ip, state := range t.clients {
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if address == "" || state.LastSeen.Before(oldest) {
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address, oldest = ip, state.LastSeen
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}
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}
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if address != "" {
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delete(t.clients, address)
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}
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}
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func isSuspiciousPath(path string) bool {
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path = strings.ToLower(path)
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for _, marker := range []string{
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"/.env", "/.git/", "/.svn/", "/wp-", "/xmlrpc.php", "/phpmyadmin",
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"/pma/", "/vendor/phpunit", "/eval-stdin.php", "/cgi-bin/", "/shell.php",
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"/cmd.php", "/upload.php", "/v2/keys", "/var/task/", "/dashboard/env-", "/app.js",
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} {
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if strings.Contains(path, marker) {
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return true
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}
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}
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for _, suffix := range []string{".php", ".ini", ".bak", ".swp", ".yml", ".yaml", ".sql", ".json", ".config", ".cfg"} {
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if strings.HasSuffix(path, suffix) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
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// Prefer the single-value header normally overwritten by ingress-nginx.
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// X-Forwarded-For can contain client-supplied values when a proxy appends
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// rather than replaces it, so it is only a fallback.
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if real := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP")); real != "" {
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return real
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}
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if forwarded := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); forwarded != "" {
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return strings.TrimSpace(strings.SplitN(forwarded, ",", 2)[0])
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}
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
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if err == nil {
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return host
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}
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return r.RemoteAddr
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}
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