The authenticator-app second factor (D4, plan §5.7): shared RFC 4226/6238
primitive in platform/auth/totp.go (±1 window, monotonic replay floor, §13
RFC vectors), per-user AES-GCM-wrapped secrets under AUTH_TOTP_WRAP_KEY,
hashed one-shot recovery codes, and the password → /totp challenge (or
recovery) → session browser flow with first-login enrollment (otpauth QR via
vendored qrcode-generator, two-code confirm, once-only recovery reveal).
AUTH_REQUIRE_TOTP defaults on; per-challenge throttling (R5). Covered E2E by
internal/oidc/totp_flow_test.go.
Passkeys (D6, plan §5.8): go-auth is its own WebAuthn RP — hand-rolled
CBOR/COSE subset parser (stdlib only), register/login ceremonies with
attestation:none, per-request RP ID + origin derived from the issuer host,
AOF-backed cred:<user>:<credID> store. The /admin UsersManager (invite,
disable, reset password, list/rename/delete passkeys, enroll in-browser) is
session + admin-role gated. WebAuthn vectors + ceremony negatives in
internal/webauthn + webauthn_flow_test.go.
Also: bare-host GET / now redirects to /login (the issuer root otherwise
404s in a browser).
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Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
