// Package mcpauth guards the MCP HTTP endpoints (cart-mcp, order-mcp,
// wishlist-mcp, promotions-mcp, ledger-mcp, finder-mcp) with authentication.
//
// These are admin tooling surfaces for AI agents / operator tooling, so the
// default is FAIL-CLOSED: when no credential source is configured the
// endpoint returns 503 rather than serving unauthenticated.
//
// Credential sources, checked in order (first match wins):
//
//  1. Minted API keys — AUTH_APIKEYS_FILE points at the shared key store
//     (the same /commerce/apikeys.json the backoffice and CMS use). Keys
//     must be minted with an "mcp" or "admin" scope. The store is reloaded
//     on mtime change, so a newly minted key works without a restart.
//     Presented as: X-API-Key: <key>
//  2. Device access tokens — AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET enables the platform
//     device-authorization flow's local JWTs (HS256). The token's scopes
//     must include "mcp" or "admin". Presented as: Authorization: Bearer <jwt>
//  3. Legacy shared key — MCP_API_KEY (dev compose sets devkey; production
//     reads it from the stack-secrets secret). Presented as:
//     X-API-Key: <key> or Authorization: Bearer <key>
package mcpauth

import (
	"crypto/subtle"
	"net/http"
	"os"
	"strings"
	"sync"

	"git.k6n.net/mats/platform/auth"
)

// authz is the combined validator built from the configured sources.
type authz struct {
	keys       *auth.KeyStore // minted keys (AUTH_APIKEYS_FILE); nil if unset
	jwt        *auth.LocalJWT // device tokens (AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET); nil if unset
	legacyKey  string         // MCP_API_KEY; empty if unset
	configured bool           // at least one source enabled
}

var (
	authzOnce sync.Once
	current   *authz
)

// buildAuthz initializes the validator from the environment once. Env is
// read at first use (Middleware construction), which happens at service
// startup.
func buildAuthz() *authz {
	authzOnce.Do(func() {
		a := &authz{}
		if p := os.Getenv("AUTH_APIKEYS_FILE"); p != "" {
			if ks, err := auth.OpenKeyStore(p); err == nil {
				a.keys = ks
				a.configured = true
			}
		}
		if s := os.Getenv("AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET"); s != "" {
			a.jwt = auth.NewLocalJWT(s)
			a.configured = true
		}
		if k := os.Getenv("MCP_API_KEY"); k != "" {
			a.legacyKey = k
			a.configured = true
		}
		current = a
	})
	return current
}

// Middleware protects the wrapped MCP handler. See the package comment for
// the credential contract. The same source order applies; a request fails
// with 401 unless exactly one source validates it.
func Middleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
	a := buildAuthz()
	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		if !a.configured {
			http.Error(w, "mcp: no credential source configured (set AUTH_APIKEYS_FILE, AUTH_TOKEN_SECRET, or MCP_API_KEY)", http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
			return
		}
		// Reload the key store when the shared file changed (cheap stat).
		if a.keys != nil {
			_ = a.keys.ReloadIfChanged()
		}
		if !a.authenticate(r) {
			http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
			return
		}
		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
	})
}

// authenticate tries each configured source and applies scope gating (mcp or
// admin required; a plain read/write-only key is not enough for admin MCP
// surfaces).
func (a *authz) authenticate(r *http.Request) bool {
	p, err := a.principal(r)
	if err != nil {
		return false
	}
	for _, s := range p.Scopes {
		if s == "mcp" || s == "admin" {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// principal resolves the request to a Principal via the configured sources,
// in order: minted key → device token → legacy key. A source that rejects a
// presented credential falls through to the next one, so a shared dev key
// still works when a keystore is also configured.
func (a *authz) principal(r *http.Request) (*auth.Principal, error) {
	key := r.Header.Get("X-API-Key")
	bearer, hasBearer := strings.CutPrefix(r.Header.Get("Authorization"), "Bearer ")

	var lastErr error
	if key != "" && a.keys != nil {
		if p, err := (auth.APIKeyAuth{Keys: a.keys}).Authenticate(r); err == nil {
			return p, nil
		} else {
			lastErr = err
		}
	}
	if hasBearer && a.jwt != nil {
		if p, err := a.jwt.Authenticate(r); err == nil {
			return p, nil
		} else {
			lastErr = err
		}
	}
	// Legacy: accept the shared key via either header form.
	if a.legacyKey != "" {
		presented := key
		if presented == "" && hasBearer {
			presented = bearer
		}
		if presented != "" && subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(presented), []byte(a.legacyKey)) == 1 {
			return &auth.Principal{Subject: "legacy-mcp", Scopes: []string{"mcp"}, Kind: auth.KindAPIKey}, nil
		}
	}
	if lastErr != nil {
		return nil, lastErr
	}
	return nil, auth.ErrNoCredentials
}