The authenticator-app second factor (D4, plan §5.7): shared RFC 4226/6238 primitive in platform/auth/totp.go (±1 window, monotonic replay floor, §13 RFC vectors), per-user AES-GCM-wrapped secrets under AUTH_TOTP_WRAP_KEY, hashed one-shot recovery codes, and the password → /totp challenge (or recovery) → session browser flow with first-login enrollment (otpauth QR via vendored qrcode-generator, two-code confirm, once-only recovery reveal). AUTH_REQUIRE_TOTP defaults on; per-challenge throttling (R5). Covered E2E by internal/oidc/totp_flow_test.go. Passkeys (D6, plan §5.8): go-auth is its own WebAuthn RP — hand-rolled CBOR/COSE subset parser (stdlib only), register/login ceremonies with attestation:none, per-request RP ID + origin derived from the issuer host, AOF-backed cred:<user>:<credID> store. The /admin UsersManager (invite, disable, reset password, list/rename/delete passkeys, enroll in-browser) is session + admin-role gated. WebAuthn vectors + ceremony negatives in internal/webauthn + webauthn_flow_test.go. Also: bare-host GET / now redirects to /login (the issuer root otherwise 404s in a browser). Generated with Codebuff 🤖 Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>
192 lines
6.3 KiB
Go
192 lines
6.3 KiB
Go
package auth
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// Time-based one-time passwords (RFC 6238 over the RFC 4226 HOTP core) —
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// the shared, stdlib-only primitive behind go-auth's authenticator-app
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// second factor (docs/plan-self-hosted-oidc-auth-service.md §5.7, D4).
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//
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// The design keeps state out of this package: Verify is pure (secret, code,
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// time → counter). Replay monotonicity is supplied by VerifyMonotonic over a
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// caller-persisted last counter (go-auth stores it per user in its AOF), and
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// attempt throttling lives with the caller's challenge session. Tests carry
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// the RFC vectors — see platform/auth/totp_test.go and plan §13.
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import (
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha1"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/base32"
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"encoding/binary"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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// Sentinel errors. ErrInvalidCode is the only error a *wrong* code produces;
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// ErrReplay and ErrTooManyAttempts describe stateful failures the caller
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// enforces with the helpers here.
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var (
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ErrInvalidCode = errors.New("auth: totp: invalid verification code")
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ErrReplay = errors.New("auth: totp: code already used (replay)")
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ErrTooManyAttempts = errors.New("auth: totp: too many failed attempts")
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ErrBadSecret = errors.New("auth: totp: invalid secret")
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)
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const (
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// DefaultStep is the RFC 6238 default time step (30 s) — what every
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// authenticator app uses.
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DefaultStep = 30 * time.Second
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// DefaultDigits is the default code length (6).
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DefaultDigits = 6
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// DefaultWindow is the ±counter skew tolerance applied on top of the
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// exact step: codes for the current and neighbouring steps still verify.
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DefaultWindow = 1
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)
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// HOTP computes the RFC 4226 HMAC-SHA1 one-time password for a counter:
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//
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// HS = HMAC-SHA1(secret, C as 8-byte big-endian)
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// off = HS[19] & 0x0f
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// bin = (HS[off]&0x7f) << 24 | HS[off+1] << 16 | HS[off+2] << 8 | HS[off+3]
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// code = bin mod 10^digits, left-padded to digits
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//
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// digits must be 6–8 (the RFC range). Negative counters are clamped to 0.
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func HOTP(secret []byte, counter int64, digits int) (string, error) {
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if digits < 6 || digits > 8 {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: digits %d out of range (6-8)", ErrBadSecret, digits)
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}
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if counter < 0 {
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counter = 0
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}
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var msg [8]byte
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(msg[:], uint64(counter))
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mac := hmac.New(sha1.New, secret)
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_, _ = mac.Write(msg[:])
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sum := mac.Sum(nil)
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offset := int(sum[19] & 0x0f)
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bin := (uint32(sum[offset])&0x7f)<<24 |
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uint32(sum[offset+1])<<16 |
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uint32(sum[offset+2])<<8 |
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uint32(sum[offset+3])
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code := bin % mod10(digits)
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return fmt.Sprintf("%0*d", digits, code), nil
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}
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// mod10 returns 10^digits as the HOTP modulus.
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func mod10(digits int) uint32 {
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m := uint32(1)
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for i := 0; i < digits; i++ {
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m *= 10
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}
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return m
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}
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// Counter returns the RFC 6238 step for a point in time:
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// C = floor((T − T0) / X) with T0 = 0 and X = step (default 30 s). Times
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// before the epoch would produce negative counters; the callers reject those
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// via VerifyWindow's candidate filtering.
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func Counter(at time.Time, step time.Duration) int64 {
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if step <= 0 {
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step = DefaultStep
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}
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return at.Unix() / int64(step/time.Second)
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}
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// Code returns the code valid at time at (window-free — the exact step).
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func Code(secret []byte, at time.Time, step time.Duration, digits int) (string, error) {
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return HOTP(secret, Counter(at, step), digits)
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}
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// Verify checks code against the RFC 6238 stream for secret at time at,
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// allowing ±DefaultWindow of clock skew (candidates C−1, C, C+1; negative
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// counters are rejected). The code is normalized (spaces/dashes stripped,
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// upper-cased) and compared constant-time per candidate. On success it
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// returns the accepted counter — the caller's replay floor. All failure
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// modes return ErrInvalidCode.
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func Verify(secret []byte, code string, at time.Time) (int64, error) {
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return VerifyWindow(DefaultWindow, secret, code, at)
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}
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// VerifyWindow is Verify with an explicit skew window (0 = exact step only).
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// The plan's §13.3 window cases drive this with window=0/1.
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func VerifyWindow(window int, secret []byte, code string, at time.Time) (int64, error) {
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norm, err := normalizeCode(code)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, ErrInvalidCode
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}
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c := Counter(at, DefaultStep)
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for cand := c - int64(window); cand <= c+int64(window); cand++ {
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if cand < 0 {
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continue
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}
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want, err := HOTP(secret, cand, DefaultDigits)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(want), []byte(norm)) == 1 {
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return cand, nil
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}
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}
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return 0, ErrInvalidCode
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}
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// VerifyMonotonic is Verify plus the replay guard: the accepted counter must
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// be strictly greater than last (the caller's persisted floor). A code from
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// an earlier step may still be inside the skew window — monotonicity is what
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// makes it useless. Returns ErrReplay for counter ≤ last.
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func VerifyMonotonic(last int64, secret []byte, code string, at time.Time) (int64, error) {
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c, err := Verify(secret, code, at)
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if err != nil {
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return 0, err
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}
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if c <= last {
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return 0, ErrReplay
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}
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return c, nil
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}
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// normalizeCode strips spaces/dashes and upper-cases (apps and humans
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// disagree on grouping, e.g. "123 456" vs "123456"); the result must be
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// exactly DefaultDigits decimal digits.
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func normalizeCode(code string) (string, error) {
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code = strings.ToUpper(code)
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code = strings.ReplaceAll(code, " ", "")
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code = strings.ReplaceAll(code, "-", "")
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if len(code) != DefaultDigits {
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return "", ErrInvalidCode
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}
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for _, r := range code {
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if r < '0' || r > '9' {
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return "", ErrInvalidCode
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}
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}
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return code, nil
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}
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// GenerateSecret returns 20 random bytes (160 bits, the RFC 4226 size) —
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// enough for the SHA-1 HOTP core. Callers store exactly what this returns;
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// SecretBase32 renders it for the otpauth:// URI.
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func GenerateSecret() ([]byte, error) {
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return GenerateSecretBytes(20)
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}
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// GenerateSecretBytes returns n random bytes for a TOTP key.
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func GenerateSecretBytes(n int) ([]byte, error) {
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if n < 16 {
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n = 16
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}
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b := make([]byte, n)
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if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return b, nil
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}
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// SecretBase32 renders a secret as unpadded base32 (RFC 4648 §6 encodes
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// without the traditional trailing '=') — the string that goes into an
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// otpauth:// URI and the authenticator app.
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func SecretBase32(secret []byte) string {
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return strings.TrimRight(base32.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(secret), "=")
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}
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