mats
fd9446632d
The authenticator-app second factor (D4, plan §5.7): shared RFC 4226/6238 primitive in platform/auth/totp.go (±1 window, monotonic replay floor, §13 RFC vectors), per-user AES-GCM-wrapped secrets under AUTH_TOTP_WRAP_KEY, hashed one-shot recovery codes, and the password → /totp challenge (or recovery) → session browser flow with first-login enrollment (otpauth QR via vendored qrcode-generator, two-code confirm, once-only recovery reveal). AUTH_REQUIRE_TOTP defaults on; per-challenge throttling (R5). Covered E2E by internal/oidc/totp_flow_test.go. Passkeys (D6, plan §5.8): go-auth is its own WebAuthn RP — hand-rolled CBOR/COSE subset parser (stdlib only), register/login ceremonies with attestation:none, per-request RP ID + origin derived from the issuer host, AOF-backed cred:<user>:<credID> store. The /admin UsersManager (invite, disable, reset password, list/rename/delete passkeys, enroll in-browser) is session + admin-role gated. WebAuthn vectors + ceremony negatives in internal/webauthn + webauthn_flow_test.go. Also: bare-host GET / now redirects to /login (the issuer root otherwise 404s in a browser). Generated with Codebuff 🤖 Co-Authored-By: Codebuff <noreply@codebuff.com>