fancy-dns/STATUS.md

fancy-dns — development status and continuation plan

Last updated after the round that finished the server shutdown paths: every transport's ordering with a query in flight is now a test, and it found two real bugs — an idle client could hold a shutdown for the whole grace period, and a UDP query in flight was neither waited for nor answered. The round before that brought the console onto the Go side of the API contract, so both halves of that are done. AGENTS.md holds the decisions, invariants and working rules; this file holds state and the plan.

Conditional forwarding update

upstream.forward_zones now routes an apex and its descendants to dedicated upstreams, using the most specific case-insensitive label suffix. Routes reuse health/breaker tracking and UDP-to-TCP retry, never fall back to public servers, and apply to background cache refreshes too. Authoritative local zones, ACLs, and blocklists retain their precedence. Upstream reloads flush the cache; console upstream edits preserve the YAML-only routes and do not promote their targets to default servers. The Kubernetes config routes local to 10.10.0.1:53 over UDP. Direct UDP and TCP probes for fastpi.local both returned 10.10.11.117. This repository change still needs a rebuilt image and rollout to become live.

Goal

A lightweight, high-performance recursive DNS server with:

• Go backend — sharded LRU cache backed by bbolt, blocklist replication from multiple formats, per-client ACLs, query logging, Prometheus metrics.
• Secure DNS — DNS-over-TLS (RFC 7858) and DNS-over-HTTPS (RFC 8484). DNSSEC validation was explicitly scoped out; AD/CD/extended-RCODE are passed through only.
• React + Tailwind admin console embedded in the binary.
• Config as zone files + YAML, hot-reloadable, with Valkey/Redis for cross-instance sync (chosen over AMQP).

Architecture decisions (settled with the user)

Decision	Choice	Why
Scope	Full production	clustering, metrics, ACLs, query logs, hot reload, Docker, k8s, CI
Config store	YAML + DNS master files	reviewable/diffable in git
Cluster sync	Valkey (Redis protocol)	simple, mature Go client, easy local dev
Secure DNS	DoT + DoH, no DNSSEC validation	avoids signer/anchor machinery; pass-through only
Hot cache	Sharded LRU in memory, bbolt for snapshots	no I/O on the hot path; warm restart
k8s networking	No hostNetwork, LoadBalancer Service	the server never sets SO_REUSEPORT, so two host-network pods cannot share :53
Memory	Soft GOMEMLIMIT, cache byte budget	a cgroup kill is an outage; a cache miss is not
Scale-out	StatefulSet, no HPA	an HPA cannot drive a StatefulSet
Unknown YAML keys	Ignore, loudly documented	KnownFields(true) was considered and rejected as a behaviour change for anyone carrying extra keys. Pinned by TestLoadIgnoresUnknownKeys.

Package layout

cmd/fancy-dns/main.go          entrypoint: flags, signals, SIGHUP reload
internal/
  config/       Config struct, Duration, Size, Validate, atomic Store + hooks,
                ${VAR} environment expansion in Load
  zonefile/     RFC 1035 master-file parser ($TTL/$ORIGIN, parens, serial math)
  blocklist/    Set (exact/sub/root maps), 4 parsers, Manager (fetch+compile+swap)
  cache/        Key, Entry, sharded LRU, TTL policy, serve-stale, bbolt Store
  resolver/     Upstream pool: health, circuit breakers, parallel/failover/random
  acl/          compiled groups, CIDR/PTR/tag matching, per-group domain policy
  localzone/    authoritative data from master files, wildcards, delegations
  engine/       THE QUERY PIPELINE (see below), reverse-PTR cache
  server/       UDP, TCP, DoT, DoH listeners; all funnel into one handler
  qlog/         bbolt query-log ring + live in-memory ring + SSE fanout
  metrics/      Prometheus collectors + rolling time-series rings
  cluster/      Valkey pub/sub, leader lease, divergence detection
  api/          admin REST + SSE, auth, CORS, rate limiting
  app/          wiring, lifecycle, API hook implementations, memory envelope,
                and the response contract the console is written against
  web/          go:embed of the built console
web/            Vite + React + TS + Tailwind console
deploy/         example config, example zones, k8s manifests

Query pipeline order (engine.Handle)

validate → ACL deny → per-client concurrency → global concurrency → rate limit
  → group allow/deny domains → local zone → blocklist → cache → upstream
  → cache put → finalize (EDNS0, UDP truncation) → metrics + qlog

Cache is a single shard-local lookup; only a miss touches the network.

Status

Green, end to end

gofmt clean, go build ./... clean, go vet ./... clean, and go test -race -count=1 -timeout 300s ./... green across every package.

Package	top-level tests	notes
internal/acl	26	group compilation, matching, first-group-wins
internal/api	55 (156 cases)	the whole route table, three auth modes, CORS, rate limiting, SSE, settings, error branches, pinned limitations
internal/app	30 (incl. the contract suite)	wiring, hooks, the API response contract, integration
internal/blocklist	28	four parsers, the set, the manager, the shipped example zone
internal/cache	27	LRU, TTL policy, serve-stale, bbolt round-trip
internal/cluster	20	Valkey lease, pub/sub, divergence, dead-peer reaping
internal/config	22	Duration/Size, ${VAR}, unknown keys, the JSON wire form, the shipped example configs
internal/engine	26	the pipeline end to end, plus the pins
internal/localzone	18	wildcards, delegation, CNAME following
internal/metrics	10	the metric names, which are the contract with the dashboards
internal/qlog	18	ring, bbolt, top domains, sampling
internal/resolver	10	pool, breakers, health, policies
internal/server	57	four listeners, UDP deadline reset, truncation, DoH limits, identity, counters, shutdown and leak
internal/zonefile	29	the master-file parser and the shipped example zone
web	0	typecheck and oxlint clean (0 errors), no test runner
cmd/fancy-dns	0	exercised by make smoke and the CI smoke job instead

The commands that matter

• make check-go — the inner loop (~1.3 s): gofmt check, vet, compile. Uses go-build, not build, because build depends on web and shells out to npm.
• make check — check-go + the suite. What CI runs.
• make smoke — new. Boots the real binary with the console embedded on unprivileged ports (the same sed rewrite CI uses), then checks -check, /api/healthz, the embedded console, the unauthenticated 401, an authenticated whoami and /api/metrics. Catches a broken embed, a bad default and an auth regression in one command.
• make web-check — console typecheck and production build.
• make bench — cache and blocklist benchmarks.

The contract gap is closed on both sides

The API response contract used to be the interesting gap. The console's types are hand-written and apiFetch ends in JSON.parse(text) as T, so nothing in the toolchain compared them with the Go structs; a field that lost its json tag, or a response a struct never had, showed up as an empty table in a browser and nowhere else. internal/app now has contract tests that assert the exact JSON key set of every admin endpoint (see the fix list), and the console has been brought onto them — so the two sides agree today, but only because someone compared them once. The durable fix is still open: see plan item 2.

The server's shutdown is now pinned behaviour, not folklore

It was the last part of internal/server tested by assumption. Four transports, three shutdown shapes (a datagram socket, a stream accept loop with configurable idle timeouts, and an http.Server that drains politely), and every one of them can strand a goroutine a client is holding open. The invariants that came out of it are in AGENTS.md; the two bugs it found are in the fix list below.

Decided this round (behaviour changed on purpose, each with a test)

• An RPZ record did not cover the name it names. rpzRule gave a bare owner name the subdomain form (*.name), so analytics.example.org. in a policy zone blocked cdn.analytics.example.org. and left analytics.example.org. resolving normally, and an rpz-passthru. record did not allowlist its own domain either. RPZ semantics say the record applies to the domain and everything under it, so a bare owner now takes the apex form **.name; an owner written with an explicit *. is still strict, so a zone that wants subdomain-only behaviour can ask for it. This changes which queries get blocked for an existing policy zone — re-read your zones if they relied on the old behaviour. TestExampleRPZZoneCoversTheApexItNames pins both halves, TestParseRPZ pins the compiled forms, and the example zone now says which half it relies on.
• metrics.OutcomeLocal had no producer. The engine reported a local-zone answer as qlog.ActionAllow, which outcomeFor mapped to OutcomeUpstream, so every locally answered query was counted as an upstream one and the dashboard's local column was permanently empty. Response.Local is now set on the local-zone path and outcomeFor consults it first, so a local answer publishes outcome="local" and is not counted as upstream. This moved published counters, which is why it was a decision: the README's metrics section and the dashboard notes are updated in the same change. TestLocallyAnsweredQueryIsCountedAsLocal replaces the pin.

Fixed this round

• The console could not see local zones at all, so it could not manage overrides or delegations. blocklist.local_zones compiled a store that nothing could read back: there was no API for a zone, its records, its delegations or the file each record came from, and no way to change one without editing YAML and reloading. The Domains page is the blocklist's inline rules, not local data, so nothing in the console covered this half of what the server does. There is now a Zones page and the six endpoints behind it (GET /api/zones, POST/PUT/DELETE /api/zones/records, POST/DELETE /api/zones/delegations, DELETE /api/zones?zone=).

  The write side is the interesting part, because the only place a zone can be changed without a human editing YAML is a file on disk:

  • The console owns blocklist.managed_zones and nothing else. One <apex>.zone per zone, holding the SOA, the apex NS set and the records added there. It is compiled by the same localzone.Load as the operator's files, so a record added from the console is served on the next query with no reload. Files in local_zones are listed and shown read-only, and the config key defaults to empty so a deployment that never sets it cannot have zone data rewritten behind its back. TestZoneWritesNeedAManagedDirectory pins that half.
  • The writer proves its own output. A record is validated by the project's own master-file parser (so www means www.<zone> and a bare CNAME target is completed, the same way it is in a zone file), the file is rendered, and that rendering is re-parsed and compared with the records it meant to write before the file is renamed into place. A round-trip that drops a record is a writer bug found there rather than by an operator noticing a zone that stopped answering.
  • A zone that cannot answer is refused, not created. No SOA means no NXDOMAIN or NODATA authority, and no apex NS means nothing to delegate to and no server to name, so a new zone has to start with one of the two. The SOA's primary follows the apex NS set, the serial moves on every write, and a record at or below a delegation is refused — the store answers those names as delegated and never reads the file, so it would be data that looks alive and never answers.
  • The engine's gate was the config list, not the store. engine.applyConfig only published local-record metrics when blocklist.local_zones was non-empty, so a zone the console created was served but uncounted. The gate is now the store's own record count.
  • Zone/ZoneRecord/ZoneDelegation are type aliases in internal/api rather than copies: one set of json tags, pinned by TestZoneEndpointKeySets at every level, with the record list filled from a real write so the assertion is about a record and not about an envelope.

  Verified end to end against a running instance: a record added through the API answers authoritatively (aa) on the next query, a cut stops the parent answering below it, and deleting the zone hands the name back. The console page itself was not looked at in a browser in this round — the browser was unavailable — so it is typechecked and built, not visually verified.

• A client that connected and said nothing held the whole shutdown open. The stream accept loop waits for its connections before Stop returns, and a connection parked in ReadMsg with no deadline in front of it only ends when the client goes away — ctx.Err() is checked between reads, so cancelling the context cannot reach a read that is already blocked. One idle TCP connection (or one DoT connection, with timeouts.tls set high) was enough to make Stop sit there for the caller's entire grace period — 15s in main — and then return context.DeadlineExceeded, which the app reports as "shutdown completed with errors". Worse, the cache snapshot the app takes right after Stop never happened: the orchestrator had already given up. It is a shutdown DoS that costs the attacker one connection, and nothing tested it. The fix is a read deadline in the past on every accepted connection when the context is cancelled, and deliberately not a close: a query already inside the pipeline is past its read, so its answer still goes out, which is the invariant TestInFlightQueryIsAnsweredAcrossStop pins. TestStopIsNotBlockedByAnIdleStreamConnection sets a 60s DoT idle timeout on purpose, so a config value cannot hide the regression behind a lucky tick.

• A UDP query in flight at Stop was lost, and nothing waited for it. The stream paths register their connections with s.wait, so Stop waits for them; servePacket did not register at all, so a UDP query already inside the pipeline when the socket closed was gone twice over — nothing waited for it, and the answer had nowhere to go even once it was ready, because a datagram is written to the very socket the query arrived on. The visible damage was not the lost answer (the client retries) but the app: it snapshots the cache and closes the store the moment Stop returns, so a query still in the pipeline could be writing to a store that was about to close. Packets are now counted in s.wait, and the UDP listener's close waits (bounded by udpDrainGrace, 250ms) for the read loop and the packets it spawned before it closes the socket. A shutdown must not spend its grace period on one slow upstream, hence the bound: past it the answer is dropped, which is what the client would see anyway. Pinned on all four transports by TestInFlightQueryIsAnsweredAcrossStop/{tcp,dot,udp,doh}.

• Stop returning did not mean the process was done. Nothing asserted that the server's goroutines were gone, so a shutdown that leaked one was indistinguishable from one that did not. TestStopLeavesNoGoroutineRunningServerCode counts goroutines whose stack still has a frame in this package — not runtime.NumGoroutine(), which in a test binary is net/http, crypto/tls and the race detector talking over each other — and it found the idle-connection bug above, since the check is the only way to see a goroutine that has no client left to answer.

• A dead peer stayed in the cluster peer list forever. Cluster.seen was only ever added to and deleted from on an explicit bye, so a node that crashed — or whose Valkey connection died — was reported as a live peer for the life of the process, and its stale blocklist digest was flagged as divergence forever. Peers() now reaps peers unheard for peer_ttl * 4 (four missed heartbeats) and stamps each state with the receiver's own clock, so clock skew between two machines can neither reap a healthy peer nor keep a dead one. Discover() ages out the same way on the publisher's own last_seen stamp, because the keyed Valkey record outlives a crash: a live node keeps refreshing the key's TTL, so a dead node's field stayed readable for the life of the fleet. TestDeadPeerAgesOutOfPeers (which was failing on the tree as handed over — the reaping it asked for did not exist) now passes.

• peer_ttl: 0 would have crashed the process. time.NewTicker(PeerTTL/2) panics on a non-positive period, and EXPIRE key 0 deletes the heartbeat key, so a config that left peer_ttl unset would have taken the process down at Start (or made every instance believe it is alone in the fleet). Both go through peerTTL()/peerDeadline(), which fall back to the default.

• Two cluster tests raced on the wire, not on the product. A node that joined after another's heartbeat was in flight hears about it on the next tick, so "b does not see a", read immediately after "a sees b", is a coin flip; and TestStatusReportsDivergentPeers waited for a digest on the wrong node's view of the fleet. Both tests were wrong, not the code.

• The partial-bind test only worked unprivileged. TestStartReportsAPartialFailureButServes used 127.0.0.1:1 as a port that cannot be bound, which is not true in any container with net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start=0 — it binds, and the test failed with both transports up. It now occupies a port with a live listener in the test process, which is a deterministic EADDRINUSE on every machine and every uid.

• Four API/console contract breaks, all found by the new contract test: blocklist.Source and SourceMeta had no json tags at all, so the Sources table rendered blank rows and its per-row toggle posted name: undefined; acl.GroupSummary was flat where the console reads a nested match, so every group card read "matches nothing"; PUT /api/clients answered 400 json: unknown field "ptr_suffixes" to the payload the console sends, because config.Group and config.Match had yaml tags only; and PUT /api/upstreams answered 400 json: unknown field "health", because the console round-trips the whole server object it read, runtime health fields included. The write structs now carry json tags, the health fields are accepted and ignored (the server owns them), and acl.Match is nested.

• A duration on the wire was a nanosecond count. config.Duration had a MarshalYAML but no MarshalJSON, so bootstraps[].refresh arrived as 30000000000 while the console typed the field as a string, and healthcheck_interval was a float of seconds in one place and a string in another. Durations on the wire are duration strings everywhere now, which is the same spelling config.yaml uses; a bare JSON number is still accepted and means seconds, not nanoseconds. TestDurationJSONForm pins all of it and says the old behaviour was the bug.

• A log row's key set depended on the row. api.LogEntry was omitempty on client_group, response, upstream and list, so a query with no ACL group arrived without the key and the console rendered "undefined" where the column should be empty. The contract test can only pin one shape if the server emits one, so nothing on that struct is omitempty any more.

• Every query from a client that asks for EDNS0 NSID got SERVFAIL. dns.EDNS0_NSID.Nsid is a hex string in miekg/dns v1.1.73 — pack hex-decodes it, unpack hex-encodes it — and the engine put the literal "fancy-dns" in it. hex.DecodeString("fancy-dns") fails, so the forwarded upstream query could not be built, the exchange failed, and the client got SERVFAIL. A one-line bug with total blast radius on a documented feature. Fixed with hex.EncodeToString, and pinned from both sides: TestClientNSIDIsAnswered (a client asking for NSID gets a real answer, the option we forward upstream decodes to our own name, and dns.hide_identity drops it) and TestPinnedEDNS0NSIDIsHex (the library contract, so a future bump that changes Nsid to raw bytes fails here with an explanation instead of silently breaking the feature).

• The login rate limiter was applied to every route except the one it exists for. allowRequest is the only reader of limitState.lockedTill and it ran behind authed, while the login route was registered through public. So N bad API keys gave N × 401 and never a 429, and the lockout instead locked the caller out of the rest of the API — brute-force protection is the one thing the auth surface most needs, and it was the one thing that did not work. There is now a limited() wrapper (the limiter only, no auth) on the login route; allowRequest stays the single reader of the lockout state. Pinned by TestLoginBruteForceEventuallyHitsTheRateLimiter, TestLoginLockoutExpiresWithTheClock, TestLoginLockoutIsPerIP, TestLoginLockoutDisabledWithoutFailures and the TestAuthedRouteRateLimit* family, so both routes stay honest.

• A successful login reset the attacker's request budget. clearLoginFailures deleted the whole per-IP limitState, which also reset the per-minute window, so one valid key in the middle of a brute-force burst handed back a fresh budget. It now clears only failures and lockedTill, and TestSuccessfulLoginDoesNotResetTheRequestWindow / TestSuccessfulLoginClearsTheFailureCounter pin both halves.

• DoH GET had no size cap. The POST path is capped by readCapped at dns.MaxMsgSize; the GET path handed ?dns= straight to a base64 decode and an Unpack, so the only limit was net/http's MaxHeaderBytes — roughly a megabyte of attacker-chosen base64 decoded per request, unauthenticated, against a 64 KiB cap on the neighbouring path. A DNS message cannot exceed 65535 bytes, so the cap is base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodedLen(dns.MaxMsgSize) and cannot refuse a conforming client. Pinned by TestDoHGETQueryStringOverTheCapIsRefused (413) and TestDoHServesALargeButLegalQuery (a message just under the wire limit is still served, so the cap cannot be tightened carelessly).

• A clean Stop sometimes returned "use of closed network connection". The DoH listener has two owners: Stop's close list, and http.Server.Shutdown, which tracks the same net.Listener because serveDoH hands it to srv.Serve. Whichever lost that race made an orderly shutdown look like a failed one. Closing an already-closed listener is not a failure, so Stop now ignores net.ErrClosed and only reports a real close error. It reproduced 3 times in 3 runs with DoH enabled and never with it disabled, which is what made it findable; TestStopIsIdempotent is the pin.

• A per-transport dropped counter did not exist. The DoH drop fix above was invisible in the UI: HandlerStats.Dropped is an aggregate that cannot say which transport dropped, and TransportStats had no Dropped field at all, even though all four transports bump the counter. Added, with the reasoning in the field's comment.

• A DoH drop was not counted as a drop. dropped when res.Drop; the DoH path only reached classify, which maps drop to errors, so HandlerStats.Dropped under-counted DoH. One line, in the same position as the other two.

• Both shipped zone files matched nothing. blocklist.local_zones and the rpz-format list source are read with the origin taken from the file's base name (zonefile.OriginFromPath: local.example.zone → local.), so the relative owner names in the examples were being qualified with that — a *.doubleclick.net rule blocked *.doubleclick.net.local., and the local zone mixed relative owners with absolute ones. An operator copying either file got a server that answered nothing and blocked nothing. Both examples now spell every name out in full, and TestExampleLocalZoneIsOriginIndependent (zonefile) plus TestExampleRPZZoneBlocksWhatItSays (blocklist, through the real parseRPZFiles path) fail if they are "tidied up" back to relative names.

• The shipped configs were never loaded by anything. deploy/config.example.yaml and the ConfigMap in deploy/k8s/00-config.yaml are now loaded through config.Load (which ends in Validate) and spot-checked, including that the k8s ${FANCYDNS_API_KEY} still expands and still fails when the Secret is missing, and that the memory envelope matches the StatefulSet's 1Gi limit.

• The admin API's response shapes had drifted from the console's types — verified against a running binary, not inferred. blocklist.Source has no json tags at all, so the Sources table rendered blank rows and its per-row toggle posted name: undefined; acl.GroupSummary is flat where the console expects a nested match, so every group card read "matches nothing"; and both write endpoints answered 400 to the payload the console actually sends (json: unknown field "ptr_suffixes" on PUT /api/clients, unknown field "health" on PUT /api/upstreams). The Go side is being fixed with contract tests that assert the exact key set of every endpoint; the console side is the next piece of work.

• The GitHub Actions image job could never tag an image. It used ${{ gitea.sha }} in a workflow under .github/, and the gitea context only exists on Gitea; the image is also published by .gitea/workflows/build.yaml, which is the pipeline with registry access. It now tags with github.sha and only logs in and pushes when this repository actually has a registry token, so a GitHub runner builds and stops instead of failing.

• api.constantTimeEqual had no callers, and the authenticator doc comment described a constant-time "API key scan" that does not exist. The real design is better than the comment (API keys are compared as SHA-256 digests through a hash-keyed map, so the plaintext is never stored) — the dead function is gone and the comment now describes the code.

• maxGETResponse was dead code whose comment claimed a guarantee the handler did not provide. Deleted; the DoH response is written as packed.

Pinned, not fixed (each one has a test that says so out loud)

The standing decision for the round after this one was: pin, do not change. Every item below is behaviour someone may want to change deliberately; each has a test that fails when it changes, and says what to do when it does.

• Unknown config keys are silently ignored (a settled decision, see the table above). TestLoadIgnoresUnknownKeys in internal/config also pins the asymmetry that makes this surprising: a typo is invisible, while a known key with a bad type is a startup failure.
• Auth configuration is frozen at New. api.base_path, api.trusted_proxies and the authenticator (auth.mode, api_keys) are captured once; a reload re-reads CORS only. Writing a new API key through PUT /api/settings answers ok while the running server keeps the old key. TestPinnedWrittenAuthConfigIsNotAppliedUntilRestart and TestCORSOriginsAreReadAtHandlerBuild hold this in place until someone decides whether a reload should re-apply it.
• DoH clients behind an Ingress all present as the proxy. httpRemoteAddr uses the raw RemoteAddr and never consults trusted_proxies, so every DoH client lands in the Ingress's ACL group: fail-closed if that group is restrictive, fail-open if it is permissive. TestDoHClientIdentityIsTheProxyNotTheForwardedForHeader pins it, with the reason honouring X-Forwarded-For without trusted_proxies would break the ACL and rate-limit invariants.
• api.cors_origins: ["*"] echoes the request's Origin and sets Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. Deliberate (a literal * is ignored by browsers when credentials are involved), but it does mean any website can drive the admin API with whatever the browser has cached for that host. The preflight also answers 204 for any origin and any path. TestCORSWildcardEchoesTheOrigin and TestCORSPreflight pin all of it.
• A partial bind failure is invisible. serveDoT/serveDoH record a failed bind in an error list only, so ListenerInfo.Err is never set and the admin API cannot show which address failed. TestStartReportsAPartialFailureButServes pins that Start returns nil whenever any listener came up.
• A question-less message is answered on UDP and kills the connection on TCP/DoT. TestUDPQuestionlessMessageReachesTheEngine pins the UDP half (the engine turns it into a FORMERR); the stream path returns instead. Probably right for both, but it is an asymmetry worth knowing about.
• doh.sent is never bumped. The DoH handler writes its answer through net/http, so the sent counter is only meaningful on UDP/TCP/DoT, and the console's transport table shows sent: 0 for DoH. Pinned as current behaviour by TestCountersFollowTheEngineOutcome with a comment saying why.
• api.metrics.path is ignored always ${base_path}/metrics); POST /api/blocklists/refresh returned {"names": null}; an empty config_yaml in the settings form is not valid (it decodes onto Default(), which enables a blocklist with no sources); "1Gi" is not a valid size — only GiB, G, GB — even though that is how k8s spells it.

Continuation plan, in order

1. Decide the rest of the pinned list, one at a time, each with a changelog note: the frozen auth config, the DoH client identity, CORS wildcards, the question-less message asymmetry, doh.sent never bumped. (The UDP query lost at Stop left this list when it was fixed.)
2. Stop hand-writing the console's types. The contract tests make the Go side authoritative; the cheapest durable answer is generating web/src/lib/types.ts from the Go structs (or an OpenAPI document emitted by the server) so apiFetch is typed against something real instead of JSON.parse(text) as T. internal/app/dump_shapes_test.go (DUMP_SHAPES=1) is the stopgap that already exists.
3. Decide whether the shutdown grace belongs in config. main hard-codes 15s for the whole Stop, and the drain inside it is 250ms of that. A Kubernetes terminationGracePeriodSeconds and a resolver's own notion of "long enough to answer what is in flight" are the same number, and right now only one of them is visible. The four-transport invariant is pinned, so changing the bound is cheap — but the knobs do not exist yet.
4. Read the pinned "not fixed" list in this file for anything that has since become untrue. Each entry claims a behaviour a reader may act on; a claim that no longer matches the code is worse than a missing one.

Design notes worth preserving

• Cache stores packed wire bytes, not *dns.Msg. A hit costs one Unpack and yields a private copy, so serving never mutates shared state and TTL ageing is free. Same trade dnsmasq makes.
• Everything the query path reads is behind an atomic.Pointer holder — ACL, blocklist, localzone, and now the upstream pool. Readers load the pointer once and work against a value that cannot change under them. Prefer a new immutable snapshot over a lock.
• Cache invalidation on rule changes flushes the cache rather than guessing which subtrees are affected (invalidateBlocklistCache in internal/app/hooks.go).
• API responses share the field names in internal/app/hooks.go. If you rename one, grep the frontend too — and now also expect internal/app's contract test to fail, which is the point of it.
• API keys are compared by SHA-256 hash, constant-time, and X-Forwarded-For is honoured only from trusted_proxies.
• The UDP listener resets its read deadline every iteration. A deadline set once expires for good and turns the loop into a spin that never reads another packet (caught by TestBlocklistToggle).
• Shutdown order is: cancel, close every listener, then wait. The close is not interruptible by the caller's context, because releasing the ports is the work the next process start needs. Everything after it is interruptible, and a cancelled context is expected to be able to cut the wait short — which is why no step in the shutdown may depend on a client doing anything.
• Only the Valkey lease holder fetches lists, so N instances do not hit a mirror N times.
• Serve-stale answers get TTL 1; an expired upstream answer is never cached; a truncated answer is never cached (it would be served truncated forever).
• PatternKind.Pattern is the display form; WireName is the wildcard form. The internal *. / **. prefixes must not leak into the UI, but the API needs them to re-add a rule unchanged (the domains list ships rule for exactly this).
• pprof is loopback-only by construction, not by policy, so no config flag can turn it into a network-reachable unauthenticated endpoint.
• A master file's origin is its base name, so a relative owner name in a zone is qualified with the file's name, not with the zone you meant. Absolute names are the only spelling that survives a rename.

Test-hygiene traps

• dns.NewRR needs a TTL column: dns.NewRR("host.example.com") does not parse. That is a fixture bug, not a product bug.
• A test that closes a stop channel after wg.Wait() deadlocks the whole package and looks like "the suite hangs". Close first, then wait.
• Assert on invariants, not on what a concurrent goroutine happened to observe. "A reader must have seen address X" is a flake; "every list a reader sees is one of the published ones" is a real property and cannot flake.
• A test that only dials a stream transport races the accept loop. Stop can close the listener while the connection is still in the backlog, the server never accepts it, and any shutdown assertion that needs a live server-side goroutine passes for the wrong reason. Exchange one query first, then leave the connection alone — that is what harness.idleStream is for.
• Count leaked goroutines by stack, not by runtime.NumGoroutine(). A test binary shares its process with net/http, crypto/tls and the race detector; a baseline count is noise. "Does any goroutine still have a frame in this package?" is a property of the product, and it needs the caller's own goroutine filtered out by id or every run finds exactly one.
• tsc -b replays cached diagnostics from node_modules/.tmp/*.tsbuildinfo. After a large edit, rm node_modules/.tmp/*.tsbuildinfo.
• vite build empties outDir and deletes internal/web/dist/.gitkeep. Restore it or the directory disappears from git. //go:embed all:dist still builds while the directory is empty, so a console rebuild in the middle of someone else's go build is not fatal.
• A TXT string over 255 bytes does not pack in miekg/dns v1.1.73 — the error is dns: string exceeded 255 bytes in txt, and 255 is the exact boundary. On a fake upstream's write path the failure is silent and presents as a client timeout, so build a multi-kilobyte answer out of many short strings and assert the fake's write error before blaming the client.
• dns.EDNS0_NSID.Nsid is a hex string, not the bytes on the wire. A plain value such as "fancy-dns" fails with dns: overflow packing opt, and a long NSID packs fine (unlike TXT). Always hex-encode on the way in.
• gofmt -l internal/ is the fastest way to see that a file does not parse.
• The console has no test runner at all — only tsc -b --noEmit and oxlint. A field-name drift between the API and the console is invisible to both, which is why the Go side now has contract tests.

Fixed earlier and worth not re-breaking

A running list, kept because each of these was invisible until it was found:

• config.ParseSize ignored the unit multiplier entirely (512MiB parsed as 512 bytes), so every memory budget in the tree was off by a factor of the unit. size_test.go pins the units, the shadowing cases, the range and the truncating rounding.
• A cache miss and a stale hit moved only the Prometheus counter and not the atomics the console's Totals reads, so the Cache page read zero for the life of the process.
• finalize — the EDNS0/UDP-size step that turns an oversized answer into a question-only TC reply — ran only on the cache-hit path, so a multi-kilobyte answer from upstream, from the local zone or from a sinkhole was left as a datagram a 512-byte UDP client silently dropped.
• The serve-stale prefetch gate was a 64-slot channel, so a burst of stale hits on one hot name launched up to 64 duplicate upstream exchanges instead of the one its own comment promised. It is a per-key latch now.
• The upstream UDP client read buffer was hard-coded to 1232 while the engine advertises dns.max_udp_size, so an operator who raised it got SERVFAIL for every answer over 1232 bytes.
• Every relative RDATA name in a master file pointed at the DNS root: the qualification pass ran after dns.NewRR, so www CNAME host became CNAME host.. It is now a token-level pass driven by a table of which RDATA positions hold a name.
• The cache snapshot never round-tripped: Load decoded the record header out of the key's remainder instead of the value, so every restart was a cold cache. There is now an encodeRecord/decodeRecord pair with a version byte and a CRC-32C trailer, and Load drops expired entries and rewrites the TTL to the time actually left.
• ${VAR} expansion never worked inside quotes — the only form anyone writes — because the reference check sat below the quote branches in the same switch. The admin API key was the literal string "${FANCYDNS_API_KEY}".
• ACL PTR suffix matching crossed label boundaries, so a group scoped to example.com. also swallowed ample.com.; the ACL * catch-all was dropped from the rendered domain patterns; Upstream.Success never closed an open breaker; Exchange fanned out in parallel even under policy: failover; the cache byte budget was never fed to the LRU.
• TestRebindUnderConcurrentQueries was a flake (2 runs in 10) because it asserted a reader had to observe two specific addresses. It now pins the copy-on-write invariant itself.
• CI could not have passed (go.mod requires Go 1.27.1, CI and the Dockerfile pinned 1.23), the Dockerfile clobbered the console by copying the source tree after the bundle, and the k8s set could not have worked (hostNetwork: true with replicas: 2 and no SO_REUSEPORT).
• $TTL was ignored by the zone parser; every record got the SOA minimum.
• Blocklist: leading BOM stripped, !allow works, SourceMeta exists for a rule-only source, Pattern() reports the bare name while WireName() gives the wildcard form, RPZ inherits the zone default TTL, hosts files complain about a missing address, adblock handles CRLF and over-long lines.
• serveUDP called net.ResolveUDPAddr per packet; the peer already is a *net.UDPAddr.